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I. Introduction

Is State Trust Land
Timber Management
"Better"Than
Federal Timber
Management?
A Best Case Analysis
By Ion A. Souder9
Sally K. Fairfax
Teresa A. Rice
Lawrence J. MacDonnell

The nation is replaying a familiar public lands
drama that has come to be known as a Sagebrush
Rebellion.) The mid-1990s version of this -hearty
perennial" begins, as they all do. with western states'
dismay at federal land holdings. The current debate is,
however, unusual in important respects. The most significant distinction between the present and all previous versions is the ubiquitous, serious discussion of
community participation in decision-making about
2
local and regional resources, particularly watersheds.
This article is based in part on the "Report to the
Washington State Board of Natural Resources from the
Independent Review Committee prepared by the authors at the
Natural Resources Law Center. University of Colorado (June 22.
1995). The opinions stated in the article are the authors' and do not
represent the positions of the Natural Resources Law Center. the
Washington State Board of Natural Resources, or the Washington
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) We do appreciate the
review of the manuscnpt by Messrs Paul Silver, Jerry Otto, Jim
Smego and Joe Shramek of the WDNR
'S Associate Professor of Forest Policy and Economics,
School of Forestry. College of Ecosystem Scence and Management.
Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, Anz Ph D, M S, University
of California. Berkeley. B S Marlboro College, Vermont,
Professor of Natural Resources Policy. Administration and
Law. College of Environmental Design and College of Natural
Resources, University of California, Berkeley Ph D, M.S. Duke
University; MA. New York University. B S. Hood College, Md.
Natural resources law and policy consultant, and adjunct
professor. University of Colorado School of Law and University of
Denver School of Law I D University of Colorado, BA, University
of Northern Colorado
Lawrence I MacDonnell, PC and President. Stewardship
Initiatives ID. University of Denver College of Law, PhD Mineral
Economics. Colorado School of Mines.
1, A good place to start on all of this is NELsON. PRIVATE RIGHTS
AND PUBLiC LANDs (1995) For a starting point on the enormous literature on Sagebrush Rebellions past and current, see also Limeric,
A History of the Public Lands Debate. a paper presented at the conference -Challenging Federal Ownership and Management." Natural
Resources Law Center. University of Colorado (Oct 11-13, 1995);
BRUBAKER. RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS (1984); Fairfax. Riding into a
Different Sunset, 79 1 FoREsTm' 516 (1979), CAwLEY. FEDERAL LAND,
WESTERN ANGER- THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL

POLITIcs (1993)

2. See, eg. KEMMIS, COMMuNrry AND THE POLTIcs OF PLACE
(1990); see also Rice. Federal Lands and Watershed Based Management
Approaches. a paper presented at the conference "Challenging
Federal Ownership and Management," Natural Resources Law
Center. U of Colo (Oct 11-13. 1995), NORTHERN LIGHTS. various volumes, especially Vol 9. No 4 (Winter 1994). Chronicle of Community,
A Publication of Norihern Lights Institutes, Vol I. No I. et seq (starting
Fall 1996). Given the focus of this piece, we accentuate the community aspects of the debate Others, particularly students of. and
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This emphasis has led, in turn, to an unusual
attempt to take seriously the possibility that
states could, in fact, play a role in the management of what we have come to discuss as "federal" 3 lands. The issue of whether the states

could "do better" is on the front burner, a frequent topic of professional panels, public
debate, and scholarly and popular articles. 4
State trust lands have emerged from the
shadows of the public lands debate and have
attracted unusual attention as part of this discussion about state potential.' Unbeknownst
to many, twenty-two western states manage
approximately 135 million acres of trust lands
for the benefit of schools and other public
institutions. 6 These lands were granted by
Congress to newly-joining states during the
accession process in order to support public
institutions such as common schools. 7 Having
labored to analyze state trust lands for many
years without much company, we were pleased
to observe that the topic is now so "chic" as to
attract the attention of the General Accounting
Office (GAO). 8

We recognize that GAO reports constitute a
special kind of attention. 9 Nevertheless, we
welcome the discussion. For far too long, public and professional debate about public
resources has proceeded as if the federal multiple use model was the only available or viable
approach. The GAO analysis makes many
important observations. It also misses or muddies a number of important poirts regarding
trust lands. For both of those reasons, it is very
much worth discussing.
The purpose of this paper is to debate with
and embellish the GAO Report by juxtaposing
it with work we were privileged to undertake for
the State of Washington.' 0 The GAO's conclusions provide a good starting point for indepth understanding of how state trust timber
land management programs work. It is appropriate to focus on Washington for comparative
analysis in the timber context because it is by
far the largest, most complex and most successful state level forest planning and management program in the nation.
Elsewhere we have argued that the

participants in, the Wise Use movement, would assert
that what is unique about the present undertaking is the
presence of a "broadly based anti-environmental movement." See Brick, Determined Opposition:The Wise Use Movement
Challenges Environmentalism, 37 ENV'T 17 (Oct. 1995). To the
extent that Wise Use is connected with opposition to the
Federal government, the two are not, of course, unrelated.

8. United States General Accounting Office, Public
Timber. Federal and State Programs Differ Signficantly in Pacific
Northwest, Report to the Chairman, Committee on

3. Nomenclature matters: referring to the "former
public domain- as either "public lands" or "federal lands"
evinces a bit of side-taking in a century-long debate.

9. The General Accounting Office responds, It frequently appears, to loaded questions from elected representatives seeking data to support a previously defined
position. And, it generally appears, that kiowing whence
cometh the butter for their bread, the GAO provides It,
The world, accordingly, little noted and will probably not
long remember a recent GAO response to questions from
Hon. Don Young. Republican Congressman from Alaska
and Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on
Resources. At present it appears that the GAO Is more
likely to service Republican legislators while the
Democrats draw necessary research from the
Congressional Budget Office, but this partisan alignment
is not stable. Personal Communication from Mark Rey
Professional Staff, Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources. United States Senate, 1996,
10. See Wash. State Bd. of Natural Resources Indep
Review Comm. Report to the Washington State Board of Natural
Resources from the Independent Review Committee (June 22, 1995)
(on file with the authors) Ihereinafter Board Report[, Our
discussion will focus on the timber management Issues
contained in the report,

4. There have been dozens of meetings, most widely advertised, perhaps, "Challenging Federal Ownership
and Management," Natural Resources Law Center, U. of
Colo. (Oct. I 1-13, 1995); but others include, for example,
"Public Lands Symposium: Public Lands in Nevada-New
Concepts for the 21st Century," Reno, NV (Sept. 16-17,
1996).
5. See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY,
MANAGEMENT & SUSTAINABLE USE (1996) [hereinafter STATE

TRUST LANDSI. See also Egan, In Idaho, Wily Opponent Who Takes
on Ranchers, N. Y.TIMES, July 21, 1995; Unranchers' Reach'for
West's State Lands, 26 HIGH COUNTRY NEws 1 (July 25, 1994);
Platts, Environmental Group Bids on Salvage Sale. 14 PERC
REPORTS 6 (March 1996).
6. Note that the number goes to about 155 million
acres when the subsurface estate is included. Discussed
in STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5, at 47-53.

7.
ch. I.

Discussed in

STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5, at

Resources. House of Representatives, GA/RECD-96-108

(1996) Ihereinafter GAO Report!. The GAO was requested
to compare federal and state timber management programs in the Pacific Northwest.
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'Washington Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) is widely regarded as the premier state
land management agency in the western U.S.
... Its programs and practices set the standard
for public land management at both the state

and federal level."" The GAO Report presents
four reasons why the Pacific northwest state
programs look good, indeed better than their
federal counterparts. 12 We have much to learn
by exploring their results.
The paper will proceed in three main parts,
The first will introduce and discuss the GAO's
findings. The second focuses on state trusts, in
general, and in Washington State in particular.
The third delves more deeply into the Washington timber program, discussing the evolution
of timber planning in Washington, and two disputes that have recently engulfed the state's
program.
The GAO Report, discussed in Part I1,concludes that although federal and state timberlands in Washington and Oregon are often
adjacent and appear to have similar characteristics, "significant differences" arise in three
principal areas: (I) the states' "legislative and
regulatory guidance" is clear and simple; (2)
the states' timberlands are primarily roaded,
second growth, hence they are "less controversial" to manage; and (3) the states' timber
sales programs rely on receipts for their funding, thus providing them with an incentive to
control costs and increase revenues, while the
federal agencies rely on annual appropriations
and thus make no connection between receipts
and expenditures. 13
These three factors are manifest in a fourth
area ofimportant difference, a state planning
process that is shorter, less complex and less
likely to invite appeals than the federal system.
Moreover, the states sell their timber differently than do the federal agencies. Unlike the
United States Forest Service, the states do not
11.

GAO Report. supra note 8, at I.

12.

id.

13.

See id. at 1-2.

14.

See id. at 6.

15. See STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5. passim; see also
Board Report. supra note 10. at ch. 1: J. R. Johnston. The Legal
Framework for the Management of Washington's Forested Trust
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have annual timber sale targets. This allows
the states to offer timber sales so as to take
advantage .of changes in timber prices. 4 The
rest of Part II will engage the GAO Report. challenging, amending and supplementing its findings.
Part III will provide background on the trust
lands in general and the Washington trust in
particular Both of those topics are treated in
more depth elsewhere." We will focus on general principles of trust land management, clarity, undivided loyalty, accountability, enforceability, perpetuity and prudence. We will use a
standard Washington case brought by
Skamania County to explore the facial difference between federal multiple use and trust
notions of undivided loyalty and prudence. We
will also draw attention to the constitutional
status of the trust mandate. Unlike the federal
multiple use lands, the trust mandate is typically enshrined in the state constitution.
Hence. the issue is not merely legislative and
regulatory guidance, as the GAO Report indicates, but indeed legislative violations of the
trust are unconstitutional. Part III will end with
an exploration of the GAO's assertions about
the sources of funding for Washington management programs.' 6 We will also note that the
GAO paid inadequate attention to how the
money that the DNR produces on trust lands is
allocated to beneficiaries.
Part IVwill delve deeper into the details of
the Washington timber management program.
First, we will explore the evolution and current
status of the state's timber program planning.
Our goal is to demonstrate that the planning
processes on federal and state lands are in fact
quite similar. We must look elsewhere for differences in outcomes from federal and state
timber programs. Then we will trace the long
and complex evolution of the process in two
disputes. The first dispute traces the notion of
Lands Limits and Imperatives, Bogle and Gates, Seattle,
Wash (June 30, 1994) Ihereinafter Bogle and Gatesi,
16 See STATE TRUST LANDs, supranote 5. at 45-47, 8586 for a fuller discussion of state funding mechanisms
generally See also Souder. Economic Strategies for the
Management of School and Institutional Trust Lands: A

ComparativeStudy of Ten Western States, Ph.D. dissertation, U.

of Calif. Berkeley 19-41. ch 6 (1990),
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prudence in recent litigation concerning the
DNR's alleged over attention to lynx habitat on
the Loomis state forest which is presently
experiencing a mountain pine beetle epidem-

all for the federal government-to the myriad
of our colleagues who have tried for decades to
point to the absurdities of the policy on feder-

ic.

The state, however, undeniably sells more
timber more efficiently than the federal government. This is, of course, not the only basis
for evaluating renewable resource management programs. But focusing on that will allow
us to identify real distinctions rather than the
superficial ones discussed in the GAO Report,
In Part IV we will return to the question
that the GAO began with: why i,; it that the
states are so much more effective in putting
timber on the market in a speedy and efficient
fashion? We reach a tentative conclusion that
the distinctions the GAO observed are more
likely to arise from the constitutional status of
the mandate and a culture that emphasizes
benefit for the beneficiary than they are to
emerge from legislative guidance and funding
mechanisms. We are not as impressed with the
DNR's planning as the GAO-it seems to us to
be similar in all its diverticulae and inefficiencies to the much lamented fede'al program,
We observe, however, that when all parties
share a basic set of expectations, in this case
the idea that the goal of management is to
make money for the beneficiary, the process is
less likely to flounder fatally. But we recognize
that when groups fight over increasingly scarce
resources, no system works very well. The
advantages in simplicity are, however, obvious.

17

The second dispute begins with a discus-

sion of sustained yield and then focuses on the
complex controversy over "arrearages" that
engulfed the DNR in the mid-1990s.
The two cases point in opposite directions.
The Loomis case underscores .differences
between federal and state management
regimes, with particular emphasis on expectations and culture.' 8 We will underscore that
although the case is deeply contested, there is
no disagreement as to expectations and goals.
The issue is what constitutes prudence.
The discussion of the arrearages dispute
starts with the observation that the sustained
yield and marketing strategies of the
Washington state program are not, upon close
inspection, as different from the federal programs as the GAO Report suggests. Both agencies have taken to their bosom the forestry profession's highly questionable dogma concerning sustained yield. 19 Both the Forest Service,
where it is statutory direction, and the
Washington DNR, where it is Board policy,
strive to achieve an "even flow" of timber from
their lands. We will argue that this ought not
be the case; the even flow approach to sustained yield is a per se trust violation. As
implemented, it gives the timber purchaser
enormous advantages over the trust in speculating in a changing timber market. Further,
timber sale procedures embedded in the
arrearages dispute allow the buyer but not the
trust to take advantage of changes in the market. We conclude again that the program is a
per se violation of the trust. We will leave the
obvious companion question-if it makes no
sense for the trust, does it make any sense at
17. See Okanogan County v. Beicher, No. 95-200867-9 (Wash Super. Ct. Chelan Co. 1996), discussed infra
note 161 and accompanying text.
18.

Id.

19.

See Parry, Vaux, et al., Changing Conceptions of

Sustained Yield Policy on the National Forests, 81 J.FORESTRY 150
(1983). For a brief discussion of how sustained yield dif-

fers from sustainable resource management, see Jon A.

al lands.

20

II. The GAO Report
The basic conclusion of the GAO analysis
reflects the interests of Representative Young
who requested the report. 2' The GAO found
that the state trust land managers were able to
offer timber sales in a far shorter time frame,
Souder, et al., Sustainable Resources Management and State
School Lands: The Quest for Guiding Principles, 34 NAT. RLS J,
271 (Spring 1994).
20. See, e.g., O'Toole, paper presentel at the conference "Challenging Federal Ownership and Management,"
Natural Resources Law Center, U. of Colo. (Oct. 11-13,
1995).
21.

See GAO Report, supra notes 8, 9.
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with fewer appeals and at significantly less
cost than their federal counterparts.2 2 With
these basic conclusions, we have relatively
few quibbles. When the GAO asked why this is
so, the report, in our opinion, stumbled. The
GAO attributed this overall difference to the
four factors, summarized above, which merit
some elaboration.
Three of the GAO's points are fairly
straightforward. The GAO asserts that the
states' "legislative and regulatory guidance" is
clear and simple, directing managers to maximize revenues over the long term to benefit
the schools and counties within the states.
This simplicity, and the connection between
timber sales and returns to the beneficiaries,
leads counties to pressure the 'state to sell
more timber.23 The state's clear, profit maximizing mandate contrasts, according to the
GAO, with the Forest Service situation: the
multiple use framework "requires that the
national forest lands be managed to produce
the greatest 'net public benefit' and to develop detailed management plans for the national forests; regulate timber harvests to ensure
the protection of other resources; and allow
the public to participate in the development,
review, and revision of forest plans." The
Report notes that "many Forest Service officials believe that this framework provides little guidance on how to balance the forests'
competing uses or to ensure their sustainability."24 In addition, the GAO concludes that
federal decision making has become increasingly difficult because of the need to "consider other statutory requirements, such as the
25
Endangered Species Act" (ESA).
The GAO Report is similarly unalloyed
regarding funding mechanisms, stating at several points that the states' timber sales programs are funded from receipts, and thus the
trustee has an incentive to control costs and
22.

See GAO Report. supra note 8.at 1-2.

23.

See id.

24.

Board Report. supra note 10. at 5 (citing Resources

Planning Act. 16

U.S.C.

§§ 1600-1614 (1974). as amended by
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increase revenues. This compares, according
to the GAO. with the federal agencies' reliance
on annual appropriations, and their corresponding failure to make decisions based on
connections between receipts and expenditures.26 The state's funding source encourages
state officials to "actively market timber to
increase revenues and to reduce timber-related expenditures to control costs." The Report
compares this situation unfavorably with the
Forest Service situation wherein the agency
"is not required to cover the costs of their timber sale programs with the associated
receipts"27 The federal agencies, in contrast

to the states
rely on annual appropriations.
Because no clear linkage exists
between the receipts from timber
sales and funding associated with the
programs, there is little incentive to
control costs or increase revenues. In
addition, the performance measures
for the federal agencies are based on
the volume of timber offered for sale,
not the actual amounts sold 28
Third. the GAO Report simply asserts that
differences in the timberlands that the agencies manage account for important programmatic differences State lands do not, for the
most part. contain old growth forests because
they have already been harvested. The state
lands tend to be second growth and are generally accessible due to extensive road systems. The federal lands are unlike these state
lands. they contain old growth, designated
wilderness areas and other special use areas,
recreation areas, and similar features And.
the Report asserts, because the federal old
growth forests provide habitat for endangered
species, the federal agency -must take addi25 16USC § 1531-1544.cztedinForestServce Issues
Relating to Its Deasion Making Process, GAOdT-RCED 96-66
(Ian 25. 1996)
26 GAO Report supra note 8, at 1-2

National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1601-1647

27

Id at 7

(1997)).

28-

Id
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tional steps to protect these remaining old29
growth forest areas."

All of those differences are, according to
the GAO, reflected in the differences between
federal and state planning processes. "While
the states have developed shorter planning
processes that satisfy their legal requirements
and get the job done quickly, the federal planning processes are more lengthy and expensive."30 The federal government is, according
to the GAO, required to consider and develop
management alternatives, while the states
merely come up with a plan.3 ' Furthermore,
because the federal government manages for
many resources while the states are only trying to produce timber, it is "difficult to get
consensus" on federal lands. 32 In addition, to

comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the ESA, 33 the Forest
Service must spend more time and moryey on
long- and short-term planning. In spite of all
that effort, the Forest Service's decisions are
still more likely to be challenged than those
of the state trustee.
A major concern of the GAO is that the
state planning process is shorter than the
Forest Service Process. The GAO concludes
that this is not because the state does not
seek public input in planning. The states,
however, have long-range plans that remain in
effect until major changes occur, and they are
used as a basis for planning individual timber
sales. Similarly, states prepare wildlife surveys well in advance of individual sale planning. As a result ,they can prepare an individual timber sale in about eighteen to twentyfour months.

29.

Id.

30.

Id. at 8.

31.
32.
33.
U.S.C. §§
U.S.C. §§
34.

See id.
See id.at 9.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 42
4321-4370a; Endangered Species Act of 1973. 16
1531-1544.
GAO Report, supra note 8,at 8-9.

See id.
36. See id. at 29. There are 2,330 in the Forest
Service and 222 in the BLM in Oregon. The BLM in Oregon
35.
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This contrasts, according to the GAO, with
Forest Service planning, which for an individual sale can take three to eight years. In contrast to the states, the Forest Service includes
a wildlife assessment in each timber sale
process. Also, because the fedeial agencies
are to manage for multiple uses, "it is difficult
to get a consensus on how to best manage
forest lands and individual sales :o achieve a
net public benefit."3 4 Complying with numerous other laws and regulations further com35
plicates the federal planning process.
The GAO also notes that the states get
through their process with far smaller timber
staff. The Report includes fiscal 1995 data on
the number of state and federal employees
involved in timber management in the Pacific
Northwest. The GAO compares 2,552 federal
employees in the two states with 322 state
staff in Washington and 219 state employees
in Oregon, 36 for a state total of 341. At first
blush, the impact is as likely intended.
Reality, however, is both better and worse
than stated. In Table 1 below we have displayed the GAO's report data on number of
personnel with its data on number of acres
managed by the states and the federal agencies 37 and the amount of timber sold by state

and federal agencies in those two states. 38
Although the GAO did not report its data in a
format to facilitate this juxtaposition, we have
been able to compare the number of timber
management personnel per acre on federal
timber lands in the region with the same category of personnel per acre on state timber
lands.39

manages the 0 & C lands, without question their most
valuable timber resource, which is, because of the 0 &C's
history as a revested railroad grant, admix;ed in checkerboard style with Forest Service lands in Western Oregon.
For a brief and excellent introduction see BUREAU OF GOVT
RESEARCH AND SERV., SCH. OF COMMUNITY 3ERV AND PUB
AFFAIRS, U. OF OR., THEO
c LANDS (1981),

37.

GAO Report, supra note 8, at 3.

38.

ld. at 4.

39. These numbers should be used with some caution since the number of employees may be counted differently among different agencies.
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Table I
Acres and staff for forest management agencies in tlh
Pacific Northwest
Agency

No. of
Personnel

U.S. Forest Service
(WA and OR)
U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (OR)
Washington
Department of Natural

Timber

Timber Sold per

Sold

Employee

Forest Acres

Forest Acres
per Employee

Managed

2.330

401 BBF

0.172BBF

222

124 BBF

0.559 BBF

FS and BLM
WA and OR
Combined
15.826.000

322*

607 BBF

1.885 BBF

2,255,000

FS and BLM
WAandOR
Combined
6.201
7,003

Resources

Oregon State Forestry
Division
219
118 BBF 0.539 BBF
875.000
3.995
* Thb WDNR reports that this number includes only their timber sales staff only, and not any
administrative support, reforestation or silvicultural management staff.
Source: Based on data assembled from the GAO Report, at 3, 4, 9. Data is for 1995.
BBF: Billion Board Feet
Because they manage so much more land
with the mandate. The trust mandate is radithan the BLM or the states, the Forest Service
cally different from the multiple use mandate.
data looks considerably less ridiculous when
This section will underscore those differences,
expressed as a per person per acre comparifocusing on Washington.
son. Conversely, the agency looks even worse
The General Land Ordinance of 1785 is
than the GAO's original presentation suggests.
probably most familiar as the origin of the
when expressing the same personnel data in
township and range system that divided the
relation to the amount of timber sold.
nation into little postage stamps of 640 acres
Washington State sells more than ten times as
each in order to sell them. 0 But that same
much timber per employee than does the
statute also established a program of granting
Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest. It is
land to support common schools, At or near
important to note, however, that the BLM sells
the time of statehood. Congress granted secslightly more timber per employee than the
tiors in each township-first one section
trust managers in the State of Oregon. This
(Section 16) and ultimately four sections-to
suggests that the trust is not the sine qua non of
new states. In 1803. Ohio became the first benenhanced performance. We shall return to this
eficiary of such a Congressional grant.4 1 The
discussion in Part IV.having noted for now that
program evolved for over a century-and-a-half
the GAO's analysis is too simple to fully
and played an integral role in the westward
explore the comparisons between federal and
expansion and state making process until it
state trust land timber management.
ended, practically, in 1912 when Arizona and
New Mexico joined the union, and actually
III. The Trust in General and In Washington
when Alaska joined in 1959 42 Hence the grants
In Particular
are among our nation's oldest public policies.
A. What Is A Trust?
The first step in locating apparent causes
for the wildly disparate results in timber management is. we concur with the GAO, to begin
40. See JOHNSTON. ORDER UPON THE LAND: THE U.S.
RECTANGULAR SURVEY AND THE UPPER MISSISSIPPi COUNTRY

(1976k.
41. For a full story on the original grant to Ohio. see
Mansfield. Educational Land Policy of the United States: Land
Grantsfor Educational Purposes Within the State of Ohio. XXVIII

and are certainly the core of our oldest public
resource policy,
Of the almost 322 million acres originally
granted to the states for school and other public institutions. 43 approximately 135 million
BARNARDAM

l- oFEouc 59 (1878),

42 For a fuller treatment see
supra note 5. at ch, 1

STATE TRUST LANDS.

43. The best general source on grants to states is
ORFIELD. LAND GRANTS TOTHE STATES WrtH SPEciA. REFERENCE

W1o1e
Numbu I
,Nme
Vlm 5,
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acres of surface and 152 million acres of mineral rights continue to be held in state ownership.44 The state school lands are not managed

subject to the same multiple use standard that
currently directs federal resource management.
That standard generally exhorts federal land
managers to achieve, on the public lands, "the
combination of uses that best meets the needs
45
of the American people."
The school land and related grants are
emphatically not multiple use lands. They are
held "in trust" by the states. With the exception
of Arizona and New Mexico, wherein the trust
was clearly established by Congress in the
states' enabling act, the trusts are established
in state constitutions. We will return repeatedly to this single, crucial observation. Contrary
to the suggestion of the GAO Report, the core
of the trust does not turn on "legislative and
regulatory guidance." Although the state legislatures are clearly authorized to make rules
regarding the administration of the trust, the
basic commitment to trust principles is constitutional "guidance," which cannot be altered by
legislative action.
A trust is a fiduciary relationship, which
means that the trustee holds and manages
property for the exclusive benefit of beneficiaries identified by the settlor, or person who set
up the trust.46 The best way to think about

state trust land is to keep in minc the kind of
trust that a grandmother (settlor) might establish to assure that her grandchildren (beneficiaries) will have funds to go to college: A
banker (trustee) is authorized to manage and
dispense the funds to the student, who is not
free to blow it on a Harley (breach of fiduciary
47
relationship by the trustee).
The key characteristic of a trust mandate,
and one which readily distinguishes state trust
lands from federal lands, is clarity of the goal:
Manage the trust resources for the benefit of
the beneficiary. The trustee must exercise skill
and diligence in making the trust productive
for the specified beneficiary. 48 Thus, the primary duty of the trustee is to act with undivided
loyalty to the specified beneficiary. 49 This is
generally taken to mean that "any derived benefit from the school trust lands mu st be used in
support of schools and may not be used to
support or subsidize other public purposes.
Any arrangement not ensuring full fair market
value for the use and/or sale of the school trust
lands violates the trust obligation ..... 50 The
very purpose of the grants was to "enable
states to produce a fund with which the states
could support the public school system."''
Some have argued that, "without exception, the principal goal, the overriding purpose,
of the trust administrative agencies is to secure

TO MINNESOTA (1915). See also GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND
LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).

trust the beneficiary to manage prudently,

44. Regarding data on the original grants, see
Gates, supra note 43, at 805-06. Current acreage data are
based on the twenty-two states that contain the vast
majority of the remaining school and institutional trust

(1959).
49. Although the existence of a trust can be Implied
in the absence of a specific statement or document, the
normal route to establishing a trust Involves a trust
"instrument." The instrument identifies the trustee and
the beneficiary, and allows the settlor to specly terms and
conditions for implementation of the trus,:
50. Bassett, Utah's School Trust Lands: Dilemma in Land

lands.

See WESTERN STATES LAND COMM'RS ASS'N, DIRECTORY

(Annual). For those who would dismiss the state holdings
as inconsequential, please recall that the National Park
Service is responsible for about 85 million acres, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service for about 100 million acres and
the U.S. Forest Service for about 180 million acres.
45. Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960,
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-53 1; National Forest Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1647; Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784.
46. See Fairfax, et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh
Look At ConventionalWisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 883-87 (1992).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2-4 (1959).

47. It is frequently observed, in fact, that a trust is
established precisely when the settlor or grantor does not

48.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170-183

Use Management and the Possible Effect of Utah's Trust Land
Management Act, 1989 1. ENERGY LAW & PoL"i 202 (1989),
51. Id.at 211. Undivided loyalty doe; not mean that
an investment or activity is disallowed if it coincidentally

benefits someone other than the beneficiary, but It does
bar programs that impose costs or reduce benefits In
order to achieve a collateral or general benefit, See, eg.,
Oklahoma Educ. Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 R2d 230 (Okla 1982);
County of Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d 57,5 (Wash 1984);
Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S, 41 (1919).
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the highest monetary return."52 Reality, as
usual, is a bit more complex. While it is true
that the trustee is required to make the trust
productive for the benefit of the specified beneficiary, that is not the trustee's only responsibility, thus the "highest" monetary return need
not always be secured. In fact, the trustee can
tolerate uncompensated use if it does not
impose costs on the beneficiary. 53 Other trust
duties are elaborated in ancient common law
principles, state statutes and case law. These
additional principles can be summarized under
the headings of accountability, enforceability,
perpetuity and prudence.
1. Accountability.
Clarity of goals facilitates accountability.
The trustee must hold trust property separate
from other property owned or managed by the
trustee, and must also deal with the beneficiary with fairness, openness and honesty. 4 In
order to meet that standard, the trustee is
specifically and comprehensively accountable
to the beneficiary. The trustee must keep property records, accounts of receipts and disbursements, and must furnish this information
to the beneficiary. 55 It is difficult to overesti-

mate the importance of this approach to record
keeping, in contrast to that practiced by federal land management agencies.
2. Enforceability.
Trust doctrine allows the beneficiary 6 to
sue to enforce the terms of the trust. Trust
obligations are fully elaborated in common
law, statutes and many centuries of judicial
experience in enforcing the trust doctrine. 57
While a manager, a judge, a local banker, or
even a citizen might debate or be confused by
the circumlocutions or technicalities of a contemporary discussion of ecosystem management, they are far less likely to be thrown off
course by clear trust principles
3. Perpetuity.
Preserving the productive capacity of the
corpus of, or resources belonging to. the trust
is one of any trustee's fundamental obligations. Ordinarily, beneficial trusts are not necessarily perpetual: A trust might be liquidated,
for example, at the instruction of the settlor
when a beneficiary reaches a certain age or
when the purposes for which the trust was
established are achieved.59 The school land

52. Patric, Trust Land Administration in the Western
States 7 (Jan. 1981).

rV'g State ofAriz ex rel Ariz Highway Dep't v Lassen, 407

53. Personal Communication from Richard
Pederson, consultant to the state land board of Colorado,
notes that managers of private trusts routinely make charitable donations when they have reason to believe that
the status of the trust will be enhanced by the good community relations that putatively accrue to such donations.
Meeting of the Western State Land Commissioners'
Association. St. George. Utah (Winter 1992).

from less to more restrictive See Fairfax, et al , Conventional
Wisdom. supra note 46, at n 194 and accompanying text
Most recently, see Selkirk-Pnest Basin Assoc- v. Idaho
(ist. Dist Idaho Bonner County) (No CV-92-0037 (Oct 9,
1992)), Plaintiffs Brief in Oppn to Mot for Summ I at
26-47,

54. Id.; see also Fairfax, et al.. Conventional Wisdom,
supra note 46, at 853-55.
55. RESTATEMENT
179.1-.2 (1959).
56.

(SECOND)

OF TRUSTS

Or others with an

§§ 172. 173.

identifiable Interest.
of the malor
distinctions observable in trust land litigation Is the Issue
of standing. Most states freely grant citizens the right to
sue to protect the trust. The Arizona and New Mexico
enabling act states that "Nothing herein contained shall
be taken as in limitation of the power of the State or of
any citizen thereof to enforce the provisions of this Act,"
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act § 28, as amended, ch.
310, 36 Stat 557 (June 20. 1910), cited in Lassen v. Arizona
Highway Dep't.. 385 U.S. 458, 472 app. to opinion (1967),
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §172. One

P2d 747 (1965) Other states are spread out on a scale

57 Whereas rules of administrative review favor
the administrator, through presumptions of deference to
agency expertise and similar, rules for review of the
trustee do not favor the trustee See Fairfax, et al,
Conventional Wisdom. supra note 46, at 847-50 for a discussion of the difference between judicial review of administrator's discretion and judicial review of the trustees exercise of discretion The case of a government trustee is
made complex by the fact that the agency frequently acts
as both administrator and as trustee58 'If by the terms of the trust, the trust is to continue only until the expiration of a certain period or until
the happening of a certain event, the trust will be terminated upon the expiration of the period or the happening
of the event-- REsrATEmE r (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 334 (1959),
The trust purposes can also be changed or the trust terminated if the purpose forwhich the trust was established
Is no longer reasonable Change in trust purposes can be
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trusts' peculiar emphasis on perpetuity derives
from the existence of the permanent school
fund which, starting around 1850, became a
ubiquitous feature of all new and revised state
constitutions. Language regarding the funds is
frequently draconian, noting that the "principle
can never be diminished" or the legislature
"shall make good all losses." What this means
is that undivided loyalty and financial productivity are forever balanced against the need to
protect the productivity of the trust, and in this
case, to do so in perpetuity.
4. Prudence.

The trustee is supposed to manifest "prudence" in managing trust resources to balance
undivided loyalty and perpetuity. The trustee
makes many choices about the nature, intensity, timing and location of development. The

trustee is allowed to withhold resources from
development while planning, to hold resources
off the market awaiting higher prices, and to
act to protect the trust's reputation in the community and the political climate necessary to
profitable operations. An ordinary person serving at the request of friends of family as a
trustee for a minor child will be held, by the
courts, to a less onerous standard of care than
a professional funds manager or forester who
has made claims of expertise in areas relevant
to the trust. Interpreting the trust principle of
prudence is complicated by the land trusts'
emphatic commitment to perpetuity.
sought under the cy pres doctrine of charitable trusts. See
Fairfax, et al., ConventionalWisdom, supra note 46. at 875-77
and references therein.
59. Both the Oregon and Washington territories are
relevant. Section 20 provided: "when the lands in said
Territory shall be surveyed under the direction of the
Government of the United States preparatory to bringing
the same into market or otherwise disposing thereof, sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in each township in
said Territory shall be, and the same are hereby, reserved
for the purpose of being applied to common school in
said Territory." For a discussion of dates of reservation
that ultimately wound up in which state, see Soderstrom
& Fairfax, Federal Reserved Water Rights for State Trust Lands?
(on file with authors).
60. 25 Stat. 681, § 10 (Feb. 22, 1889).
61. Except California, which is peculiar in this as in
most other things. See Gates, supra note 43, at 301-04.

These five themes of (1) clarity and undivided loyalty, (2) accountability, (3) enforceability, (4) perpetuity and (5) prudence, form
the core of the trust mandate. They are constitutional rather than statutory requirements.
Each state has defined the trust a little differently, and Washington has some particularly
interesting peculiarities to which ve now turn.
B. State Trust Lands In The State of
Washington
1. The Trust in Washington

Washington joined the Union when
Congress was granting two sections in each
township for the support of common schools.
The standard pattern was followeh First
Congress reserved and then granted the
"school sections." Congress reserved lands for
the support of common schools in the 1848
Organic Act creating the Oregon Territory and
in the 1853 Organic Act creating the
Washington Territory. 59 The 1889 "Omnibus"
Enabling Act by which Washington, Montana,
North Dakota and South Dakota joined the
union, granted the reserved sections 16 and 36
to the new states.60 As it had in all new states, 6'
the Enabling Act promised five percent of the
proceeds of the sales of Federal public lands
within the states, but specified that the money
go to a "permanent fund" the inte-est on which
would be used to help support the common
schools. 62 lb addition, Congress granted to the
new state of Washington fifty sections of land
62. Supra, note 60, at §13. Congre;s has amended
the 1889 Enabling Act eight times at th request of the
four states to clarify, alter or expand upon its intentions
with respect to lands granted for educa:lonal purposes.
The 1932 amendments allowed the sale of lands principally valuable for grazing purposes for $5 per acre as an
exception to the general requirement that such lands sell
for at least $10 per acre. The amendments specifically
authorized the exchange of such lands for others "of equal
value and as near as may be of equal area ...."They
authorized leasing of the lands for mineral development
for up to 20 years and for hydroelectric power for up to 50
years. They also authorized the states to use lease rentals
and other income not derived from permanent sales of
the lands for direct maintenance and support of school
and institutions instead of going Into the permanent
fund. in 1938, the term for agricultural and grazing leases
was extended to ten years. In 1948, the state legislatures
were broadly authorized to set the term'; and conditions
for mineral leases. The 1952 amendments authorized
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"for the purpose of erecting public buildings at
thecapitol of said States for legislative, executive, and judicial purposes." 63 and reaffirmed
previous acts granting lands for "purposes of a
university."64 It also granted 90,000 acres for
"the use and support of agricultural colleges,"65
100,000 acres for "the establishment and maintenance" of a scientific school; 100.000 acres for
state normal schools; another 100,000 acregrant for public buildings at the state capitol;
and 200,000 acres for state charitable, educational, penal and reformatory institutions.66
In return for these grants, the State of
Washington, again like all new joining states,
waived all right and title to the remaining unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries of the state; and the state of Washington
agreed never to tax the federally owned lands
within its jurisdiction. This was done in the traditional "compact irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people" of the
state, in Article XXVI of the Washington State
Constitution. These quid pro quo underscore
that the compact was a bargain. 67
Other provisions in the State Constitution6 8 provide "guidance" for the state in locating, disposing of and managing the grants.
Article XVI of the State Constitution provides
that:

each of the states to pool its revenues earned from min-

eral leasing and apportion the funds among the schools
and institutions based on the original granted acreage.
An amendment in 1962 specifically authorized the State
of Washington to use funds from the sale of the lands
granted for charitable, educational, penal, and reformatory institutions for the construction of such institutions. In
1967, Congress authorized the states to use rentals on
leased lands, proceeds from the sale of timber and other
crops, and other forms of income for the acquisition and
construction of facilities as well as for their maintenance
and support.
63. Supra note 60. §12.
64. Supra note 60, §14. See also Thomas R.Waggener.
The Federal Land Grant Endowments:A Problem in Forest Resource

Management, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Wash,
72-77 (1966) [hereinafter Waggener].

65. Supra note 60, §16.
66. Supra note 60, §17. This section specifically
empowers the state legislature to determine the manner

lalll the public lands granted to the
state are held in trust for all the people
and none of such lands, nor any estate
or interest therein, shall ever be disposed of unless the full market value of
the estate or interest disposed of, to be
ascertained in such manner as may be
provided by law, be paid or safely
secured to the state ... 69
By the time Washington joined the Union,
a familiar pattern for dealing with land grants
had emerged. Nevertheless, there is idiosyncratic language in every accession. 70 A most
important Washington peculiarity is the phrase
"for all the people." The relationship between
the goals of the grants and the establishment
of a trust "for all the people" continues to be
debated. It may have been to resolve the question of whether the proceeds from the permanent school fund were to be distributed just to
the benefit of the schools within the county in
which the lands were sold, or were to be available statewide Others have argued that it
gives standing to sue to vindicate trust principles to all the citizens of the state.7' Still others have suggested that the "all the people"
phrase permits management of the trust
resources for a broader range of beneficiaries
than the schools and other institutions.72 This
question will reemerge in the context of specifin which these lands are to be 'held, appropriated, and
disposed of' consistent with the purposes for which they
were granted
67 See Fairfax, et al.Conventional Wisdom, supra note

46. §I1
68 For a brief review of the proceedings at the constitutional convention as they relate to school lands see
Wilfred I Airey A History of the Constitution and Government of
Washington Teritory. unpublished Ph D Dissertation, U.of
Wash (1945).
69. WASH CoNsT art XVI, § I
70 See Fairfax. et al. Conventional Wisdom. supra note
46, at 818
71. See JAMES R JOHNsTON, THE LEGAL FRA EWORI FOR
THE MANAGEMENT OF WASHINGTON'S FORESTED TRuST LANDS,
LiMiTs AND IMPERATIVES See also Bogle and Gates. supra note

14. at 5 n4. Fairfax. et al..
Conventional Wisdom. supra note
46. at 850 n 194
72. Discussed In Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom,
supra note 46, at 873-77
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ic disputes in Section III, below.
The Washington Constitution also provides details on the management and disposition of the lands. Disposition of lands granted
for educational purposes must be at public
auction to the highest bidder. The value of the
land is to be appraised by a board of appraisers, and the sale price must be at least equal to
the appraised value. 73 Each sale of land can
include no more than 160 acres; lands within
an incorporated city, within two miles of an
incorporated city, and with an appraised value
of more than $100 per acre must be platted
into lots and blocks with not more than five
acres in a block and not more than one block
may be sold as a parcel in each sale.7 4 Article Ill
of the Constitution, creating the executive
department, establishes the position of
Commissioner of Public Lands. 75 The duties of
the Commissioner are to be established by the
legislature, and the Commissioner is to be
elected to a four-year term of office. 76
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obtained by the state either by transfer or purchase, primarily from the counties. These lands
are generally presumed, with some meaningful
inaccuracy, to be held in trust.
There are actually two categores of Forest
Board lands. Forest Board Purchase lands were
acquired, beginning in the 1920s, by purchase,
gift or transfer from the counties. The State
purchased cut over lands "chiefly valuable for
the purpose of developing and growing timber."80 The second category is called Forest
Board Transfer lands. The state legislature
authorized the State to take over lands held by
the counties because of tax fore:losures that
could be "used as state forest land." 8 1 Both categories of Forest Board lands are held in trust
by the DNR, but they should be distinguished
from the federal granted lands because of the
difference in their origins and the differences in
the purposes for which they are managed.
Forest Board lands are held, by statute, to
"promote generally the interests of reforestation."82 The Forest Board lands cannot be sold,

2. The Trust Lands in Washington
The Washington DNR manages five million
77
acres of public lands in Washington. Of
those, over 2.2 million acres originated as
statehood grants. That is, approximately 74
percent of the original grants remain in state
ownership.78 Another important Washington
peculiarity79 is the Forest Board lands. The
DNR manages 622,000 acres of forest lands
73.

See WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.

74. See id. art. XVI, § 4.
75.

Id.art. Ill, § 23.

Administrative arrangements for the 22 western
managing trust lands is discussed in STATE TRUST

76.

states
LANDS, supra note 5, at ch. 2. The elected commissioner is
not a Washington peculiarity, but it is unusual. Only
Texas, Washington. South Dakota, New Mexico and
Arkansas elect their land commissioners.
77. Of this total, 2.1 million acres are aquatic lands
and are not considered in this discussion. The DNR actually has a number of important functions beyond managing trust lands. The DNR manages tidelands, shorelands,
harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters, referred to
as the aquatic lands. The DNR implements the Forest
Practices Act regulating timber harvesting and other for-

est practices on private and state lands. The DNR has
responsibility for forest fire protection on both state and

although timber and other products may be
sold and the lands may be leased.8 3 Although
the proceeds from Forest Board land transactions are distributed to the counties in which
the lands are located, the Board ands are not
intended to produce income for beneficiaries
and the state is not under any trust-like obligation to make them productive. 84 Note also
that the trustee's obligations regarding the
private lands Finally, DNR manages certain state lands
set aside as protected areas. See STATE TizusT LANDS, supra
note 5. at 42-43 for a discussion of the difference between

free standing and integrated trust land management
78. STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5,at 48 For d discussion of the shift in policy from disposing of the land to
retaining it,
see id.at 30-3i, 90-99.
79. Which it shares with Oregon Se id at 150-58
80. WASH. REv, CODE § 76,12,020,
81.

Seeid. § 76.12.030,

82.

Id.
§ 76.12.020.

83.

Seeid, § 76.12.120

84. Proceeds from these transactions are to used
for their management (up to 25 percent for transfer lands
and 50 percent for purchase lands) with the balance paid
to the county in which they are located for distribution In
the same manner as property taxes, See supra note 83.
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Board lands are defined in statute and thus
can be changed by the legislature. The trust
surrounding the granted lands is,as noted
above, defined in the Washington Constitution.
3. Trust Administration in Washington
As was typical, the Enabling Act and the
Constitution left enormous details about the
management of the granted lands to the state
legislature. Washington, like most other
states, has gone through a number of different
institutional arrangements reflecting a number of different management philosophies and
priorities during the last century.8' The modern era began in Washington in 1957, when the
state made a number of crucial decisions
about trust land management and institutions.
The DNR was created to consolidate a
number of functions related to management of
state lands and resources. The new DNR. in its
first Biennial Report announced a decision to
"retain and manage state lands wherever economically feasible, instead of selling them."86
Also the DNR was finally granted authority to
exchange granted lands. 87 The remodeled DNR
consists of a board of natural resources, an
administrator and a supervisor.88 The elected
Commissioner of Public Lands called for in the
Washington Constitution is the administrator
of the DNR.89
These changes and decisions concluded a
long period of conflict and debate about
forested lands in the state.90 They also coincided closely with the emergence of trust prin85. For an interesting compilation of earlier laws
see Stanley Hugh Jones, The Development of State Forest Land
Administrationin Washington Through LegislativeAction. unpublished Master of Forestry thesis. U.of Wash. (1954),
86.

WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES FIRsT BIENNIAL
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ciples as controlling on granted lands in the
western United States. As we have discussed
elsewhere.9 ' prior to the 1950s. most states
had approached the trust lands in ways strikingly similar to the federal management of
federal public lands. By that we mean that the
lessees dominated the policies, and for the
most part, the beneficiaries were a secondary
consideration.
A series of lawsuits, beginning in 1957 in
Nebraska.9 2 and peaking in 1966 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Lassen v Arizona,9 3
clearly reiterated the trust notion as controlling on granted lands Thereafter, a series of
institutional and cultural changes began in
most western states that gradually altered the
expectations and priorities surrounding management of the granted lands. For example,
the Washington legislature directed the Board
of Natural Resources to establish policies to
achieve "maximum effective development and
use" of trust lands and resources q In another
statutory provision, the legislature stated that
the maximization of economic return is -the
prime objective" of trust land management 95
In keeping with the subsequent environmental era, however, the Washington legislature has also directed that a "multiple use concept" be utilized in the management of all
state-owned lands where -such a concept is in
the best interests of the state and the general
welfare of the citizens thereof, and is consistent with the applicable trust provisions of the
various lands involved " The Washington
Supreme Court has, in several important
cases, including Skamania v Washington. under90

See Jones, supra note 85, passim

91

STATE TRuST LANDs, supra note 5, at 33-36

92 See Ebke v Board of Educ Lands & Funds, 47
NW2d 520 (Neb 1957)

REPORT 34 (1956-58).

93

Lassen v Arizona, 385 U S 458 11967)

87. The Enabling Act had been amended by
Congress in 1932, authorizing exchanges of granted lands.
but the Washington legislature had not acted on this
change until 1957. This authority has been the backbone
of the State's effort to reposition its holdings away from
environmentally sensitive lands and consolidate its holdings on highly productive timber sites.

94

SeeWASH REv COOE§4330 150

95

SeeWASn REv CODE§7901 095 Icalling forperi-

88.

See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.30.030.

89.

WASH.CONs. art. III1.§ 1. 23.

odic economic analysis of state trust lands -where the

nature of the trust makes maximization of the economic
return to the beneficiaries of income from state lands the
prime objective')
96

See WASH

REv CODE § 7968010. discussed in

Fairfax. et al . Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46, at 904-07.
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scored that the trust commitments are "real."97

Nevertheless, when combined with the "for all
the people" language of the Washington
Constitution, and the trustee's obligation to
maintain the long-term productive capacity of
the trust, balancing these obligations requires,
as noted above, that the trustee evince consid98
erable "prudence."
Questions about the mandate came to a
head in the early 1980s in a dispute over
whether the legislature could divert trust
resources to provide for the timber industry.99
Before turning to the issue of funding sources
for management that so enthralled the GAO,
let us look at the resulting dominant case in
Washington trust law. The Skamania case will
introduce the crucial concept of prudence in
the context of the trustee's diverse obligations
and clarify the importance of the constitutional status of the mandate. The dispute also
illustrates the standard method of enforcing
the trust principles, highlighted the importance of financial returns in trust management,
and made unmistakable comparisons between
federal and state management of public
resources.
As we shall see in the next section when we
discuss the emergence of forest planning in
Washington, the 1970s were a defining period
in management of forested trust lands. In the
Skamania case, the most important facts had to
do with a sharp rise and then a plunge in timber prices.100
The close of the decade was accompanied
by a rapid increase in timber prices. Timber
purchasers bid up sales from both federal and
state lands, basing their bids on the presumption' that timber prices would continue to
increase.' 01 Shortly thereafter, the inevitable
occurred. During 1981 and 1982 the market
price for lumber dropped sharply. Timber purchasers were faced with "working contracts" for
97. County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127,
685 P.2d 576 (1984).
98. See infra, Section IV.3, where we will juxtapose
the older Skamania case, emphasizing maximum returns,
with the more recent Okanogan case involving management of the Loomis Forest in part for lynx habitat.
99.

See supra note 97.
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which they had paid $300 to $800 per thousand
board feet (MBF) while the market value of the
timber had fallen to about $175 per MBF The
purchasers appealed both to the state legislature and to Congress, requesting that they be
released from their contracts without penalty. At
the federal level, there is no interest group that
has an identifiable stake in protecting timber
receipts to the Federal treasury, and no established expectation that the federal sales program will make a profit. Thus, Congress complied, and the federal purchasers vere allowed
to default on their contractual obligations at a
102
small fraction of the normal penalty.
The storV unfolded quite differently regarding Washington's trust lands. First, the trustee,
the DNR, which manages the trust lands,
objected strenuously to passage of the relief
bill. Their opposition was unsuccessful, but the
interests of the trust were defended heartily by
the trustee. The timber purchasers argued that
it was in the long-term interests of the trust to
protect its market-effectively saying that if all
the purchasers went bankrupt, there would be
no one to purchase their timber. The legislature enacted the Forest Products Recovery Act
in 1982,103 which authorized defaults and provided means for extending the contracts under
modified terms.
Thus far, the federal and state stories are
quite similar. Washington took a sharply different path, however, when one of the trust beneficiaries, Skamania County, filed suit, arguing
that the act violated the state's duty of undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiaries. The
Washington Supreme Court agreed, ruling that
the state as trustee has a duty of u idivided loyalty and a duty to act prudently, which duties
were violated by placing the interests of the
timber industry with respect to its contracts
over those of the trust beneficiaries. 104 DNR
negotiations with the 82 defaulting companies
100. See id.
101. Discussed inSTATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5, at
33-35, 160-66.

See also Federal Timber Contract Payment
102. See id.
Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 98-478, 98 Stat 2213 (1984).
103. W.SH. REV. CODE §§ 79.01.1331,1339.
104. See supra note 97.
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concluded in 1989 with settlements returning
nearly 75 percent of the original contract value.' 0'
For present purposes there are three key elements of the Skamania decision. The first is the
bald comparison between the outcome on federal land, where there is no group or interest which
attaches particular importance to the financial
returns on a sale, as opposed to the state, where
there are beneficiaries who care, sometimes
enormously, about returns. The second major
element is the trust's constitutional status, manifest in the court's discussion of the legislature's
authority relative to trust lands. As we have
noted, the Washington Constitution left the legislature enormous discretion to make rules and
set standards regarding the management of the
trust. Nevertheless, the court distinguished the
general authority of the legislature to act in the
state interest from its more limited authority to
act with respect to trust lands:
Where the statute deals with state trust
lands, however, the permissible goals of
the legislation are more limited. The federal land grant trusts were created
specifically to benefit certain named
beneficiaries ....

Every court that has

considered the issue has concluded that
these are real, enforceable trusts that
impose upon the state the same fiduciary duties applicable to private
trustees. 106
The court made it clear that the state cannot
use trust assets to pursue other state goals. This
duty requires the state to obtain full value for
trust assets that are transferred, and it prohibits
the state from actions respecting the trust assets
105.

WASHINGTON

STATE

DEPARTMENT

OF NATURAL

RESOURCES ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1989).

106. Skamania, supra note 97, at 579-80 (citations
omitted).
107. See Skamania, supra note 97, at 580 (finding

that the statute creating the Forest Board transfer lands
"imposes upon the state similar fiduciary duties in Itheirl
management and administration").
108. See id.at 582-83.
109. Quite apart from the trust obligation, the
Washington Constitution requires that the state also
receive fair market value for all state property sold, See

that provide benefits to others (here the timber
purchasers) at the expense of the trust beneficiaries.107 no matter how laudable may be the reasons for providing other benefits.
The third key element of the decision is the
duty to manage trust assets prudently)108 In this
narrow discussion of prudence, the court held
that it means diligently pursuing contract claims.
According to the court, releasing contract claims
unilaterally, without clear benefit for the trust
beneficiaries, is not prudent "09The court noted
that the timber industry argument was based on
a single report with limited data from a single
economist. Relying on such skimpy information
to make a decision that would cost the trust
approximately $90 million was not prudent.1 0
We will return in Section IVto a more detailed
discussion of prudence as it is discussed in the
Loomis case

4 Funds and Fundingfrom the Trust Lands.
The GAO paid relatively little attention to
either the notion of prudence, or the enforceability of the mandate in the courts It focused
instead on the economist's theory that the best
way to direct administrative behavior is to tie
management activities to program income. A
brief overview will put the GAO's conclusions
into perspective
a, Where the Money Comes From
In Fiscal Year 1996. total income generated
from the state trust lands was $311 million,
about 55 percent coming from the Federal granted lands and 45 percent from the Forest Board
lands,"' Expenditures for management of these

lands totaled $60 6 million 112 The vast majority
of receipts are from timber sales, 82 percent in
supra Skamania note 97, at 582-83

110 See Skamania. supra note 97, at 588, STATE TRrsT
LA'r,, supra note 5, at 160, and accompanying notes. We
noted there and we reiterate that we hope some day that
someone will take the tme to approximate what the"timber buy out bill cost the federal government
Ill Personal Communication from Bill Koss,
Wash Dep't of Natural Resources flune 1, 19951112 Revenues are totals for the State Grant Lands
and the Forest Board Lands Expenditures are totals from
the Resource Management Cost Account Ifor the State
Grant Landsi and the Forest Development Account (for
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the case of the grant lands and 99 percent for
the Forest Board lands."1 3
b. Where the Money Goes
An important, yet often overlooked, aspect
of management is the process for disbursement to the beneficiaries. The standard pattern
is that rents and receipts from sale of renewable natural resources are distributed directly
to the beneficiary. Royalties on non-renewable
resources and receipts from land sales are typically deposited in a permanent fund, the interest from which is disbursed to the beneficiaries. Washington's approach is complicated
both by the presence of the Forest Board lands,
and by the creation, in 1967, of the School
Construction Fund.
Since 1967, Washington has not deposited
timber or most lease revenues in the permanent school fund. Instead, the receipts are distributed directly for the construction and renovation of school facilities. This shift was made
because the interest from the permanent
school fund was considerably less than the
annual revenues earned from the sale of timber." 4 Note that because this change in state
policy was in fact a change in the Enabling Act,
5
the shift required the approval of Congress.'
It is also important to note that there are
many more beneficiaries of trust land management than the GAO deals with. Recall also that
the trustee is obligated to keep separate
accounts for each trust. So, whereas common
school beneficiaries are not affected by shifts
in the regional allocation of management
effort or policies in a particular area-they are
averaged out over the state-each beneficiary
only draws from the funds which its own lands
produce. Therefore, their cash flow may in fact
the Forest Board Lands).

WASH.

DEP'T

OF NATURAL

RESOURCES. ANNUAL REPORT 16. 17, 27-28 (1996).

113. Seeid.at 17,28.
114. Elsewhere we have spoken at considerable
length about the relationship between earnings in, the
permanent fund and management decisions for renew-

able and non-renewable resources. See STATE TRUST

LANDS,

supra note 5. at chs. 3, 6-7.
115. For the relationship between Constitutional
and Enabling Act provisions, see STATE TRUST LANDS, supra
note 5, at 26-33.

be affected in the same way that the Forest
Board counties are by a shifting geographic
focus of harvest or harvest calculations.
Moreover, different beneficiaries may have different preferences regarding the flow of
returns. Some have need for a steady, predictable income over time. Others might prefer
that the state "play the market" and get higher
returns when the market allows, recognizing
that there will be periods of reduced income as
well. This preference depends in large part on
how the beneficiary derives the remaindertypically the vast majority-of their funds. If
the state legislature views the trust income as
a drop in the funding bucket and provides the
remaining needed funds irrespective of what
the trust earns in a year, then the beneficiary is,
again, indifferent to fluctuations in trust
income. Ifshifts in the trust income are not offset by legislative appropriations, however, the
beneficiary cares very much about the periodicity of the returns.
Regarding the Forest Board lands, there
never has been a permanent fund involved.
After the state deducts a percentage for management costs, 116 including reforestation, the

remainder is disbursed to the county in which
the land is located for distribution in the same
manner as used in the distribution of real
7
property taxes." 1
The fact that the receipts return to the
counties for timber harvested within that county means that counties pay considerable attention to the timing of harvests in their jurisdiction and the geographic basis for which harvests are planned. School land distributions
are not, in contrast, tied to the area of origin,
which means that school officials are indifferent to where harvests are located. Hence, it
116. Up to 25 percent for Forest Board transfer
lands and up to 50 percent for Forest Board purchase
lands are placed in the Forest Development Account
(FDA). Similar to the RCMA, the FDA monies are appropriated by the Legislature. WASH, DEP'T. OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, ANNUAL REPORT 27-29 (1996)
117. See id. In 1968 the Washington Attorney
General issued an Opinion pointing out that the counties,

when they originally acquired the lands through tax sale,
held title in trust for state, county and other taxing districts entitled to tax revenues from the land 1968 Ops
Wash. Att'y Gen. 10.
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makes sense that the counties should be
pressing for intensified management, but only
on th6 lands in their county. What happens in
other jurisdictions affects beneficiaries of the
federal grants but not recipients of Forest
Board land disbursements." 8

pated operating expenses, the Board may disburse the excess.121 This has occurred every
year since 1977, resulting in more than $165
million of "excess" or unused management
funds being passed to the trust beneficiaries in
the past seventeen years 122

c. Funding for Management
The GAO's main point regarding trust
funds concerns the relationship between
receipts and expenditures as a way of encouraging the agency to control costs and emphasize returns. We share their conclusion. We
also note, however, that the facts are not as
simple as the GAO Report suggests. For Forest
Board lands, the funding situation is fairly
straightforward: The state created a Forest
Development Fund for Forest Board lands in
1923.
For the granted lands, the situation is
slightly more complex. In 1961, the state legislature established the Resource Management
Cost Account (RMCA) as a dedicated fund for
the management of the granted lands. n 9 The
RMCA dedicated a percentage of the gross
receipts from the granted lands (originally a
maximum of 20 percent and increased to 25
percent in 1972) to be used for "defraying the
costs and expenses necessarily incurred in
managing and administering all of the trust
lands." 2 0 The availability of this fund gives
DNR somewhat greater independence in
establishing long-range management programs for the lands since the legislature is not
being asked to authorize a DNR budget out of
general state revenues. The legislature, however, still must appropriate funds from these
accounts biennially.
By Board policy, when the RMCA fund balance holds more than twelve months of antici-

5. Summary.
The GAO Report tells a simple story about
why the states are more efficient at managing
timber It focuses on alleged differences in legislative guidance, funding mechanisms, timber
type and planning requirements, We have tried
to point out that the trust mandate is more variegated in its contributions to differences than
the GAO observed, and have done so by
emphasizing the constitutional status of the
trust and the notion of prudence, as well as the
role of the beneficiary in defending the trust.
We have also tried to intensify somewhat their
discussion of sources of funding We now have
sufficient background to pursue these issues in
a detailed examination of timber management
on Washington State trust lands
IV. The Timber Management Program in
Washington
The burden of the present section is two fold. First, we want to disagree rather sharply
with the GAO's conclusions about the state
and federal planning processes. The GAO has
suggested, wrongly in our assessment, that
whereas the federal land planning is distorted
and slowed by NEPA, ESA and other multiple
use considerations, state land use planning is
not similarly affected. It is easier to obtain consensus on state lands, the GAO concludes,
because they are only planning for the production of timber 23 We will trace the evolution of

118. See infra notes 175-186, and text accompany-

1988 From late 1988 to the present, whenever the RMCA

ing, for a discussion of this in the sustained yield context,

accumulated surplus funds, the Board would disburse the
funds to the appropriate fund or beneficiary

119.

See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.64.010.

120. Id.
121.

See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 332.100,040. Since

1978 the balance has been distributed inone of two ways.
From 1978 to 1988 DNR would suspend accepting funds
into the RMCA until the balance reached the desired
level. This occurred from 1978 through 1983 and early in

122 Interview with and comments of Bill Koss.
Wash Dept of Natural Resources tMay-lune 1995) The
Forest Board lands receive no portion of the RMCA distrbution as their management fees enter the Forest
Development Account The FDA has not had a surplus
income situation similar to the federally granted lands
123 See GAO Report, supra note 8. at 8-9.
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forest planning in Washington into a current
dispute involving the Loomis forest to demonstrate that these lands are not noticeably less
controversial, nor is the process less complex.
We conclude that we will have to look elsewhere for an explanation of why the state program runs so much better.
The other task of this section is to look
closely at two key disputes surrounding
Washington DNR's management program. At a
gross level, the disputes should challenge the
GAO's assertion that DNR timber programs are
not controversial, or challenged politically or
in the courts. We shall look first at timber salvage issues on the Loomis State Forest.
Ironically, the GAO singled out the State's
management of the Loomis situation as exemplary, especially when compared to the federal
agencies' conflicted salvage operations. 24
Subsequent events have put the GAO's glib
sustained yield and timber sales arrangements
discussion to rest. 125 The case also provides a
much fuller look at the issues of prudence and
perpetuity that are necessary for understanding trust management generally, and particularly where it actually differs from federal management. Second, we will look at a technical
but intense dispute about arrearages that
engulfed the Land Commissioner in the early
to mid-1990s. This will enable us to explore
areas where the federal and state management
programs are similar-in their embrace of sustained yield definitions and marketing mechanisms that are, we argue, per se violations of
the trust. This section will enable us to ask, in
effect, "Well, if the states are not more efficient
for the reasons the GAO cited, where should
we look for meaningful differences?"
A. Evolution of the Forest Management
Planning Process
If the GAO is correct in asserting that state
lands are inherently less controversial than
federal lands, then we are home free. We
understand why the trust mandate appears to
work more quickly and efficiently than the fed124.

Id. at8.

125. See Souder & Fairfax, Arbitrary Administrators,
Capricious Bureaucrats and PrudentTrustees: Does It Matter in the
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eral programs. If, however, the s~me conflicts
exist and the state handles them better, we
need to pursue the question of why that Is so.
An introduction to the forest management
planning process in Washington should
accomplish two things. First, it should challenge the GAO's assertion that the State's planning process is simple and abbreviated
because it is not afflicted by the controversial
elements that badger the federal agencies, for
example, NEPA requirements, ESA controversies, old growth conflicts, alternative generation and multiple products, each of which
leads to litigation and appeals on federal
lands. The GAO implies that these problems
do not afflict the 'state. The evolution of the
planning process will demonstrate, to the contrary, that precisely the same issues arise on
state lands that shape federal management.
This should come as no surprise. It is the
GAO's suggestion that is counter-intuitive. The
same interests that challenge the federal programs are just as active and alert in challenging the state program.
Second, the discussion should give a further flavor to the importance of two trust
notions: prudence and clarity of mandate. Our
discussion of the planning process will first
underscore the basic point that the same controversies exist. Second, we will focus on clarity and prudence, two notions that inhere in the
trust and which, in the context of -:he constitutional status of the mandate discussed above,
we believe contribute to the observed differences between federal and state planning and
management. It is not that the issues and conflicts do not occur, but that the state is autho-'
rized and required to handle them better.
Forest management planning became a
"process" and a major preoccupation for
state
managers at about the same time and in
response to approximately the same issues as
occurred on federal lands. This new era of state
trust land planning had its genesis in a dispute
over harvesting timber without an adequate
environmental impact statement.126 The
Review of Timber Salvage Sales? 18

PUB LAND. & RES.

L, REV.

165 (1997).

126. See Noel v. Cole, Mem Op. No. 9806 (Wash.
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Washington Legislature enacted a State
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) in 1971.127
The DNR believed that state trust land timber
sales were exempt from SEPA. In fact, the DNR
had been granted an exemption from the
assessment requirements of the state's "little
NEPA." The issue was addressed and resolved
in litigation surrounding the "Classic U"timber
sale from state lands on Whidbey Island. 28 The
sale of timber included clear cutting a 255 acre
tract in July 1977. and proceeded without environmental review under SEPA. The DNR's
exemption to SEPA was challenged by environmental organizations and overturned in Noel v.
Cole.129
All timber sales were thus halted by the
dispute until the DNR completed an environmental analysis. The agency responded, in
1979, with the first of a series of forest planning
processes, the Forest Land Management
Program (FLMP), which yielded the first Forest
Land Management Plan, accompanied by a
programmatic environmental impact state"
ment as required by SEPA. In October 1979,
environmentalists again filed suit, claiming the
environmental analysis was inadequate. 30 This
set of events set the DNR on the course of
planning, planning documents, reports, and replanning and revised documents summarized
in Table 2.
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This familiar scenario figured prominently in
the next election of a state land commissioner.
The new Commissioner. Brian Boyle, was elected
in 1980. He promptly resolved the issues in the
original 'Classic U" suit, agreeing to reduce the
timber harvest by half,' 3' and settled the challenge to the adequacy of the environmental
analysis by undertaking a new round of planning.
The new and improved 1983 FLMP defined
forest management guidance for a ten-year planning period.3 2 The document set broad policy.
concluding, "in managing the Federal land grant
trust the Department is to be primarily concerned
with generating income for trust beneficiaries but
must manage by following prudent practices and
by taking precautions to preserve the trust assets
for future beneficiaries.' 33 Three broad management goals for state forest lands were described:
(1) conserve and enhance the natural resources
of state forest land: (2) provide financial support
that balances the level and flow of revenue to the
trusts; and (3) provide social and economic benefits. 134 In 1986. Commissioner Boyle precipitated the Timber, Fish and Wildlife (TFW) process
that resulted in an agreement to revise forest
practice regulations for greater environmental
protection.
The GAO also asserted that one of the reasons that state lands were less controversial to

Table 2
Chronology of Washington DNR Forest Planning Policies

1979
1982
1983
1986
1987
1988
1989
1992
1996

Forest Land Management Program (& Final EIS)
1983-1992 Forest Land Management Program (FLMP)
Final Forest Land Management Program, 1984-1993 (& Final EIS)
Timber, Fish, and Wildlife Agreement
State Forest Board Lands: Report to the Counties
Strategic Plan for Forest Resource Management
Commission on Old Growth Alternatives for Washington's Forested Trust Lands
Final Forest Resource Management Plan, 1992-2002 (& Final EIS)
Habitat Conservation Plan (& Final EIS)

Super. Ct. Island Co. June 23. 1978). Order Granting
Summ. 1.(January 3. 1979).
127. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010 et seq.
(West 1998); WASH. ADmN. CODE §§ 197-11-400 et seq
128.

01135-2 (Wash Super Ct Thurston Co. 1979)
131 Se WAsH DEVT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ANuAL
RFPorr(1981), repnnted ifTOTEm 2 (January/February 1982).
132 Seeid atxii

See id...

129. Supra note 126.
130. See 2.1 Million Acres of Trees v. Cole, No. 79-2-

133

It

134 See WASH DEP T OF NATURAL REsourcEs, RNAL
FoREsT LWD MANAGEMENT PROGR.
1984-1993 11983,

Volume 5,Numblr I

ilon/A. Sooder, et ol.

Volume 5,Number 1

ion A.Soude~ et al.
manage is because the state does not
encounter controversies regarding old growth.
This is in part correct. The State of Washington
does not, in fact, manage an enormous amount
of old growth. Of the nearly two million forested acres managed by the DNR, less than 5 percent, or about 65,000 acres, are old growth
defined as more than 160 years old. '1 5 These
older stands are located primarily throughout
the western Olympic Peninsula and are intermixed with the Olympic National Forest. But to
say that they are not controversial is absurd.
What is important to note, however, is the way
in which the state responded to the disputes
that inevitably arose.
In 1988, Commissioner Boyle established
the Commission on Old Growth Alternatives for
Washington's Forest Trust Lands. Old growth
concerns had been raised as part of the Timber,
Fish and Wildlife discussion but, rather than
becoming a part of the 1986 agreement,
Commissioner Boyle agreed to address old
growth issues separately. 136 In 1989, this thirtythree-member commission produced a consensus report recommending the creation of an
experimental forest on Olympic Peninsula trust
lands with the goal of producing acceptable
timber harvests while retaining the ecological
values of old growth forests, deferring harvest
for fifteen years on 15,000 acres of old growth
forest to allow research into ways to extract
timber while preserving wildlife habitat, and

purchasing up to 3,000 acres of trust lands with
unique natural features warranting permanent
protection. 37 Although a management plan
was developed by a citizens comm ttee in 1990,
DNR never officially adopted the plan. DNR
then began its own planning process, which is
not yet complete. 138 One of the six goals of the
program is to maintain harvest levels. This goal
has not been met as a result of the subsequent
listing of the spotted owl and marbled murrelet
as endangered species under the ESA,' 3 1
Several other major policy documents
emerged in the late 1980s. In January 1988, the
DNR produced a "Strategic Plan for Forest
Resource Management," described as a business plan for trust forest resources. 140 The
described "central" goal of the strategic plan is
to "conserve and enhance the natural resources
of state forest lands while attaining the highest
long-term net income from these lands "141
These documents led to the adootion of the
second major ten-year plan for Washington's
forests.
In 1992, the Board adopted the Forest
Resource Plan ("Plan") governing management
of state forest land for the ten-year period 19922002.142 The major changes in the 1992 plan
were a "landscape" planning approachand an
improved wildlife habitat policy Also, there was
a change in process followed during the development of the FLMP that not only included
broader participation within the DNR, but also

135. See WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, FINAL
FOREST RESOURCE POLICY PLAN, 1984-1993 (1983); FINAL
FOREST RESOURCE POLICY PLAN, JULY 1992 at 17 Ihereinafter
1992 POLICY PLANI.

Purchasers Committee; and member, Olympic
Experimental State Forest Advisory Committee (April
1995); Telephone Interview with Art Stearns (May 24,
1995).

136.

This decision was made because most of the

old growth was on state trust lands whereas the wildlife
issues arose on intermixed state and private lands.
Telephone Interview with Art Stearns, Assistant Manager
for the Community and Landowner Assistance Section,

Resource Protection Division. Washington State DNR
(May 24. 1995).

137. See WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ANNUAL
REPORT 7 (1989).
138.

See Okanogan Co v. Belcher, No. 95-2-00867-9

(Wash Super. Ct. Chelan County 1996) [hereinafter
Okanoganl, Belcher briefing document at 35-36.
139. Interview with Jill Mackie, Pacific Lumber &
Shipping Co.; Chair. Dept. of Natural Resources Timber

140. WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 3 (January 1988).

141.

Id. at 27. During development of the FOREST

LAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM,

the DNR considered moving

approval of individual timber sales from the Board to the
Commissioner. This idea was rejected follzwing a determination that a broader review process produces better
decisions. The process was modified, however, so that
sales are now taken to the Board following advertising,
rather than before, to expedite sale processing WASH.
DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
MANAGEMENT

PROGRAM

9

1983-1993

FOREST

LAND

(1982) lhereinafter FLMPI;

Telephone Interview with Art Stearns (May 24, 1995).
142. 1992 POLIcY PLAN, supra note 13. at 9.
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earlier public involvement.
The Plan's stated primary goal is to "conserve and enhance the natural resources of
state forest land while producing long-term,
stable income from these lands." 43 Among the
"major" policy changes identified in the plan is
placing "more emphasis on protecting ecosystem diversity and providing habitat for endangered and threatened wildlife and plants" and
making "additional efforts to analyze the effect
of its activities of aquatic systems, including
watersheds, riparian areas and wetlands, and it
will modify its activities when necessary to protect these resources.' 44
The Plan outlines several general management policies governing its trust assets, In
deciding whether to sell. exchange, or acquire
granted lands, the "Department will balance
current economic returns and trust benefits
with future economic returns and trust benefits." 145 Exchanges of Forest Board lands will be
based on whether timber harvesting is impractical and whether the lands can be replaced
with productive forest lands.146 Lands unavailable for harvest are to be designated as "offbase" and are not to be used in calculating the
sustainable harvest. 147 State forest lands are to
produce a sustainable, even-flow harvest of
timber, "subject to economic, environmental
and regulatory considerations."148 Because of
regulatory uncertainties about the amount of
timber that can be harvested, the Department
did not calculate a sustainable harvest level for
the period 1992-2002.
The tone and direction of planning, its origins in a series of disputes and law suits, and
the repetitive and cycling nature of the process
are all familiar. It is noteworthy that the state
can get it done more or less on time. But the
state planning process is not the wildly different process that the GAO suggests exists on
state lands. It was born in the same disputes
143.

Id.at 13.

144.

Id.at 14.

145.

Id.at 15.

146.

See id. at 16.

147.

See id.

148.

Id. at 17.

that have shaped federal planning and it
responds to the same problems: old growth
preservation, wildlife habitat, watershed quality and environmental protection. This becomes
even clearer when the issue of endangered
species, which the GAO suggests does not
exist on state lands, is added to the mix.
B. Forest Management Planning and The
Endangered Species Act
Even before the spotted owl was listed as a
threatened species in 1990. the DNR had been
involved in efforts to improve state lands management to address environmental concerns.
As discussed above, Commissioner Boyle
addressed both wildlife and old growth concerns in special public involvement oriented
planning programs in the mid-1980s In 1990,
the U-S Fish and Wildlife Service (FWSI listed
the Northern Spotted Owl as an endangered
species
Under section 9 of the ESA, listing of a
species commences a prohibition on the -taking" of the species.149 Taking has been interpreted by the FWS regulations and by the
Supreme Court to include harm to the species'
habitat resulting in death or injury.'" All lands,
regardless of ownership, are subject to the provisions of the Act The FWS developed guidelines for establishing protected owl sites on
certain lands Since first developed, some of
these guidelines have been withdrawn by the
FWS, or modified as a result of miscalculation
of owl "circles" In addition to the federal
requirements, the listing triggered regulation
under SEPA, the State Environmental Policy
Act The SEPA requirements affect both state
and private lands within the state. A SEPA
analysis is required on lands comprising the
most suitable 500 acres for nesting. breeding
and foraging habitat surrounding a documented owl activity center '1i
149 ESA supra note 25, § 9, 16USC § 1539
150 Set Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities tor a Greater Or, 515 US 687, 690-91, 70408 (1995)
151 See Okanogan, supra note 138, Belcher briefing
document at 32, Owl briefing documents, see also WAsAc?,.in CorE § 223-08-260, Crown Pac, Ltd v DNR, FPAB
No, 94-33 (Forest Practice Appeals Board June 1995),
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The DNR responded to the listing in several ways, as summarized in Table 3, infra. First,
the DNR established interim guidelines. DNR's
Forest Practices Division established procedures for the protection of the owl based on
regulating activities within a 2.2-mile radius of
an identified nest site or activity center on the

Olympic Peninsula or a 1.8-mile radius in the
rest of the state (the Cascades). FWS guidelines required that at least 40 percent of the
suitable habitat for owls within these circles
52
must be protected.
The Board approved a staff-developed risk
assessment approach that first categorized
three types of habitat: Type A (old growth),
Type B (mature forest), and Type C (younger
stands with some old growth/mature components). It then created five risk categories: 1
(within an owl circle), 2 (type A or B habitat
less than five miles from any known center but
not in a circle), 3 (Type A or B habitat greater
than five miles from any known center or type
C less than five miles from any known center),
4 (type C habitat greater than five miles from
any known center), and 5 (non-habitat). Risk
category I sales proceed only if an owl survey
has been completed and an evaluation shows
more than 40 percent potential habitat
remains within the circle. Risk category 2 and 3
sales proceed only if no owls are found during

Since 1991, the DNR has postponed, halted or repurchased timber sales because of the
projected risk of taking, 53 Within one year,
about $20 million of sold timber under contract had been repurchased by the DNR
because of spotted owl problems and the
inability of purchasers to log. 1 4 Since the listing of the owl, the DNR has worked with the
FWS to ensure that developed standards and
procedures are consistent with Federal guidelines for avoiding a "take" of the species.
Standards for identifying protected "circles," or
setting radii surrounding known owl sites, were
developed. Guidelines for surveying owl habitat and for suspending operations were also
developed by the DNR.
Spotted owl survey protocols were
changed as "take" guidelines were reviewed
and revised by the FWS. In March 1992 the FWS
issued revised survey guidelines. One of the
changes required the DNR to shift from oneyear surveys to two-year surveys, and made
inadequate the existing one-year surveys on
most of the sales scheduled from March
through September. This decision to shift to a
two-year survey for future and pending tales
was made to avoid possible exposure to liability as a result of the changed survey protocols. 155 The shift caused a significant drop in
timber sales that year. In addition, the definition of potential owl habitat-was also modified,

a survey. Risk category 4 *and5 sales can proceed without a survey.
Ta
ble 3
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1993
1996

Chronology of DNR responses to the Northern Spotted Owl listing
Northern spotted owl listed as threatened species by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS).
FWS announces initial "take" and survey guidelines.
DNR develops initial 1-year surveys for northern spotted owls.
DNR established "take" risk criteria.
DNR staff first considers Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) idea.
FWS revises survey guidelines, requiring 2-year surveys; DNR goes to 2-year survey.
DNR revises definition of potential owl habitat, adding additional acreage to risk analysis.
DNR again investigates idea of HCP as additional species listings become likely.
Commissioner initiates development of HCP.
HCP finalized and approved by Board of Land Commissioners.

appeal pending; Comments of Paul Silver. Deputy Attorney
General. Washington State Attorney General's Office (May
30. 1995).

document at 32-33. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has
modified its rules defining prohibited "taking" since the
species was initially listed,

152. See John R. Edwards, Impact of Spotted Owls and
the Department's Timber Sale Program. Briefing for the Board
of Natural Resources (Oct. 1, 1991).

154. See Board of Natural Resources. Minutes
(Sept. 3,1991).
155. Conversations with DNR staff members (May-

153.

See Okanogan, supra note 138. Belcher briefing

June 1995).
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resulting in the need to conduct surveys in
areas previously not within the definition.
Finally, in 1993, the marbled murrelet was
listed, prompting additional surveys to avoid
takings of this species. The combined consequence was that many sales that had been prepared for sale were delayed while DNR risk
analysis procedures were completed. From
1991 to 1994, sales figures continued to reflect
the impact of these procedures initiated in
1992. DNR's response is an example of a decision for the long-term interest of the trust over
the short-term revenue production although,
because timber prices rose during this same
period, revenue was not dramatically affected. 56 The harvest and sales levels in 1995
appear to be on the rise over the previous four
years.
Most recently, the DNR initiated a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP) process under section
10 of the ESA as another response to the owl
listing. The DNR began reviewing this option in
1991. Staff reports were developed and the DNR
decided against the approach at that time, As
the impact of the listing on state timber lands
becane more apparent, the potential risk of
"taking" was increased and the DNR began
spending more funds on surveys and other risk
assessment analyses. In 1992, the DNR staff
again looked at the HCP process when it was
revealed that additional species would likely be
listed. In 1993, the Commissioner created a new
section within DNR to develop an HCP for 1.6
million acres of state trust lands affected by the
listing of the spotted owl.
This new DNR initiative was reported to the
Board at its inception, and the Board has been
kept apprised of the planning process. The
scope of the planning process includes all state
forest lands within the range of owl habitat.
Department of Natural Resources staff have
developed strategies for the plan and have,
since August, 1993, regularly reported to the

Board on the progress of the plan. In the spring
of 1995, the DNR presented a range of conservation recommendations or alternatives to the
Board 157
Perhaps enough has been said to suggest
that the GAO's assertions are erroneous, and
that the Washington timber management planning must in fact respond to the same endangered species, old growth, and related environmental issues as the federal planners, What is
unique about the state's planning process has,
in fact also already been suggested It has less
to do with the particulars of the process, the
opportunities for appeals, or the requirements
for this or that procedure than the GAO infers.
At bottom, the difference is that the trust managers know what they are planning to achieve
Goals are not likely to be debated on state trust
lands in the same way that they are on federal
lands The Skamania case discussed supra has
illustrated the importance of the trust mandate
in the face of an effort to divert trust resources
to the timber industry More recent disputes
allow us to explore differences and similarities
in timber management to locate meaningful
differences in the timber programs

156. Interview with Jack Hulsey. Chief, Forest
Resources Division. WDNR (Mar. 22. 1995).
157. Interview with John Calhoon. Habitat
Conservation Planning Director, Wash. Dep't of Natural
Resources (Mar. 20, 1995); Interview with Bill Koss (May

158 This case is discussed from the perspective of
the trustee's requirement to be prudent in Souder &

30, 1995).

C. Two Disputes-The Okanogan and
"Arrearages"
1, The Okanogan case ' 3
The emerging shape the trust mandates
with respect to timber management is particularly fruitful for highlighting the key notion of
prudence that was only partially visible in the
Skamania case The structure of the Okanogan
case is significantly different from that in the
previously discussed Skamnania litigation t5 9 In
the current dispute, plaintiffs are challenging
not acts of the legislature but decisions of the
trustee. Hence. issues of constitutionality, presumptions that acts of a legislature are constitutional, the role of the legislature, and the
clarity of the trust mandate, although impor-

Fairfax. Arbitrary Admnistrators, supra note 125, at 200 et
seq
159, Se supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
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tant at some level, are not the focus of the
case. The dispute deals squarely with the central notion of prudence. That leads very quickly, as we shall see, to issues of perpetuity.
In July, 1995, Okanogan County and fourteen school districts sued the DNR regarding
planning and management on the Loomis
State Forest, located in North Central
Washington and entirely made up of lands
with the Common Schools as beneficiaries.
Basically they charge that the trustee has violated its duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary, putting environmental interests ahead
of the beneficiaries in managing the forest. 60
The DNR has done this in the midst of a pine
beetle epidemic that, petitioners charge is
destroying the standing timber on the Loomis
and creating an emergency that could lead to
a catastrophic fire. This they do, again according to petitioners, to over-comply with environmental restrictions, most particularly the
protection of endangered species such as the
lynx. The lynx is not in fact a listed species.
However, environmental groups are concerned
that roading for timber sales will impact lynx
habitat.
The Loomis State Forest is unique in the
Washington DNR's portfolio of trust timber
lands. First, it is the largest state forest, which
at 134,000 acres comprises about 5 percent of
all lands managed by the DNR. Second, its
timber resources-principally lodgepole pine
-have traditionally had so little value that
timber harvests had not been conducted. This
situation changed with the rise in timber
prices in the early 1990's, which caused the
DNR to first start scheduling timber harvests
there. Both environmental groups and the
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife

objected to these sales. Then newly-elected
Commissioner Boyle withdrew these sales
pending the recommendations of a citizen's
review group for the goals and objectives for
the management of the LoomiE State Forest. 161 The citizen's group recommendations
provided the framework for the craft Loomis
State Forest Landscape Plan and its accompanying EIS, released in March, 1994. About a
week after the court reached its first opinion in
the Okanogan case, in June, 1996, the DNR pub162
lished the final plan.
The plaintiffs described the DNR's planning process as a tactic that simply demonstrates "that the DNR has chosen to favor the
interests of its environmental constituents
over its legally mandated trust responsibilities."'163 It therefore asked the court to:

160. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Memorandum in
Support of Petitioners' Request for Mandatory and

Support of Petitioners' Request for Mandatory and
Injunctive Relief at 23-24. Petitioners asked for a mandatory injunction, a writ of mandamus and a permanent
injunction. The discussion focused not on the legal
requirements defining those forms of relief In

Injunctive Relief at 9.
161. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of
Roy Henderson, Northeast Region Assistant Manager,
Washington State Department of Natural Resources at 4.

162. See WASH.' DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Natural
Resources Board Adopts Long-Term Plan for Managing Loomis
State Forest (Press Release June 4, 1996).
163. Okanogan, supra note 138, Memorandum in

require the DNR to undertake a commercially reasonable and prucent program of harvest and salvage that will
(1) preserve the trust as!3et from

further damage due to mountain pine
beetle, (2) recover as much value as
possible for the trust beneficiaries,
and (3) reduce the risk of catastrophic
fire in the Loomis Forest. 164
Specifically, the petitioners "equested a
writ of mandamus ordering the Department to
comply with a state law that directs them to

"determine if the sale of the damaged timber
is in the best interests of the trust for which
the land is held."' 65 The statute requires such
determination be made within seven months
of the Department having identified the damage, and plaintiffs charged that such determination was being arbitrarily and capriciously

Washington, which were obviously much debated, but on
the gist of the complaint focusing on prudence

164. Okanogan, supra note 138, Decision at 9 (citing
WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.795).

165.

Id.
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withheld.i66 Finally, plaintiffs requested that
the DNR be required to implement a plan for
the forest that had been devised by their expert
witness. 167 Plaintiffs argue, in sum, that the
Loomis is in crisis and that the state has no
options: certain clearly identifiable measures,
all of which turn on intensified harvesting, constitute the only available path to prevent catastrophe and meet the trustee's obligation of
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries.
This is a very difficult argument to sustain.
The plaintiff's case turns, at bottom, on the
assertion that managing the Loomis is a "nobrainer." The natural processes on the forest
proceed in uncomplicated and predictable
stages, and the only thing that the trustee can
do, for the beneficiary and the long term productivity of the forest, is to harvest, harvest and
intensify the harvest.
The DNR responded to that textureless
assertion with a discourse on prudence.i6
That, rather than the legal or empirical merits
of the charges and counter charges is the focus
of this analysis. Needless to say, the DNR did
not argue that they were not obligated to act
with undivided loyalty to the school trusts. The
state's brief and accompanying declarations
focus on prudence as the necessary response
to complexity: complexity in the forest ecosystem and in achieving forest health; complexity
in present and future economic opportunities,
and the trustee's obligation to set priorities in
a cost constrained management environment;
complexity in the constantly shifting social and
legal environment that could further constrain
management options; and complexity doubled
and redoubled in balancing the needs and
demands of today's beneficiaries against the
obligation to evince loyalty as well to future
generations of beneficiaries.

Prudence is most obviously manifest in the
judgment of experienced experts dealing with
a complex biophysical system Whereas the
plaintiffs described the Loomis ecosystem as a
simple cycle of inevitable stages, the DNR
argued that neither the problems nor the solutions were clearly defined Responding to an
intervenor's assertion that "the timber trust
lands are nothing more than tree farms r6 the
state emphasized the diverse fish, water,
wildlife, vegetation and historic and cultural
resources that make up a healthy forest. And
they challenged the plaintiff's specific assertions regarding pest outbreaks and fire hazards. One expert with thirty-years experience in
dealing with pests and fires in the region analyzed the Loomis. the "risk of ignition, current
data available- and
fuel conditions, and
concluded that "in its current condition, the
Loomis is not likely to experience a catastrophic fire "170 The state presented similar
data concerning the control of pine beetle
infestations, 'eroding the plaintiff's unalloyed
assertions that there was "only one way out" of
the dilemma Finally, the state challenged the
assumptions of the petitioners' management
plan, such as their assumption that annual per
acre growth is reasonably predicted to be 200
board feet per acre "The derivation of this
amount is not explained," declared Walt
Obermeyer. manager of the Forest Inventory
section "A conservative way to measure the
produces a growth
productivity of the forest
feet per acre per
board
84
[predictionl of only

166. See Okanogan. supra note 138. Decision at 8-9,
167. See Okanogan. supra note 138. Memorandum in
Support of Request for Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at
2-3. They also asked, of course, for attorney's fees,
168. See infra notes 170. 171. 173. 174, 176-182. and
text accompanying.
169. Okanogan. supra note 138. Trial Brief of the
Timber Counties at 10.
170. Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of
George Flanigan, Assistant Manager for the Community

and Landowner Assistance Section, Resource Protection

7
year,"1 1

Because the plaintiffs were alleging that
the trustee had abandoned the beneficiary in
favor of environmental priorities, one element
of the DNR's discussion of biological factors
was to establish a prudential justification for
Division, Washington State DNR at 4-7 The declarant

opined, moreover, that'improved access which accompanies timber harvest due to road construction will exacerbate the risk' He concluded,, however that the same
improved access would also 'assist suppression efforts
and result lini an overall reduction of catastrophic fire risk
in the Loomis"
171 Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of *aft
Obermeyer at 2 temphasis in original)
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considering all the resources of the forests, not
just the timber. Petitioner, intervenor timber
counties, stated the issue squarely:
So long as the laws are obeyed and no
nuisance is created, it is no concern of
the Trustee whether... their management preserves bio-diversity or achieves other environmental goals. For
example, if long-term maximization of
timber revenues consistent with the
general laws results in the total
destruction of lynx habitat in the
Loomis Forest, then the lynx must go.
172
They are not trust beneficiaries.
The state could not and, of course, did not,
argue that it had an obligation to the lynx or to
achieve any other biodiversity goal. The state
did, however, tie overall health of the forest
ecosystem to long-term trust productivity.
Citing the Forest Resource Plan, they noted:
lilt is important not to foreclose reasonably foreseeable future options for
support. One way DNR does this is by
attempting to retain the capacity of the
forest to sustain its components and
biological relationships. The trustee's
172. Okanogan, supra note 138, Trial Brief of the
Timber Counties at 10 (embracing language in Skamania
that suggests that the Forest Board lands are identical to
the school and other granted lands). Nevertheless, they
are clearly not identical, because, as noted above, the
DNR is under no obligation to make the lands productive
for the benefit of the counties, only to share with the
counties a percentage of whatever receipts are produced.
See id.at 5.
173. Okanogan, supra note 138, State Respondent's
Brief in Opposition to Request for Mandamus Writ at 23
(citing FOREST RESOURCE PLAN (FRP), Appendix A at 10-12,
16-19); see also Okanogan, supra note-138, Declaration of

Art Stearns at 12. This conclusion is supported by a recent
Attorney General's Opinion (AGO) on the precise subject.
1996 Ops. Wash. Att'y Gen. 11. "Though providing economic support to the beneficiaries remains the primary
purpose of the Department's responsibilities with regard
to the federal grant lands, this purpose does not exclude
all other considerations so long as such considerations
are consistent with protecting the economic value and
productivity of the federal grant land trusts." Id.at 49. The
AGO also cites with approval the recent findings of the
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duty to make the trust property productive is, in the case of land assets,
related to biological productivity.
Because forest productivity has long
been, and is still, the subject of professional debate, it is prudent to protect
the full range of resources on state
trust lands .

. .

. DNR has concluded

that it is sometimes necessary to
forego maximum potential current
income in order to ensure the ability to
produce income over the long term,
DNR strives to generate substantial
revenue for the trusts by prudently
managing the trust assets in a manner
that will preserve their ability to sup7
port the trusts in perpetuity. a
Thus, the state argued, it is not necessary
for the lynx to be a beneficiary. Protecting the
lynx, water quality, and fish habitat are each
essential elements of maintaining forest
health for two reasons. First, the trustee would
be imprudent to foreclose the possibility that
water, fish and wildlife would some day
become marketable and valuable trust
resources. 17 4 Second, forest health is essential
to sustainable growth of trees, which comprise
the trust's corpus.
Utah Supreme Court. "To the extent that preservation of

non-economic values does not constitute a diversion of
trust assets or resources, such an activily may be pru-

dently undertaken. To the extent that tha protection of
non-economic values is necessary for maximizing the economic value of the property, such protection may be prudently undertaken. when such preservation or protection
results in a diversion of assets or loss of economic opportunity, a breach of duty is indicated." Id at 48 (citing

National Parks and Conservation Ass'n. v. Board of State
Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 916 (Utah 1993))
174. "For example, conifer boughs sales, pole sales,

mushroom harvesting leases, and small diameter timber
sales serve as examples of current revenue sources which
did not appear feasible in the past. DNR previously recognized the value of native genetic material and set aside
2,147 acres of gene pool reserves to ensure that native
genetic material, well adapted to local conditions will be
available to the trusts In the future, DNR attempts to
maintain the production capacity of trust assets."
Okanogan, supra note 138, State Respordents' Brief In
Opposition at 29 (citing FRP, supra note 173, Appendix A
at 18-19).
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Long-term productivity is not, as we have
discussed elsewhere. 17' necessarily an element
of trust management. A trust established to
help a grandchild pay for college may. for
example, terminate after the beneficiary graduates. The school lands trusts are peculiarly tied
not simply to long-term considerations but to
perpetual productivity. This arises because of
the school grant's close relationship to the permanent school fund-both the lands and the
funds are a part of the trust. Hence, the productive capacity of the trust must be perpetuated. This means that the trustee is not
allowed to prefer present beneficiaries over
future beneficiaries, heightening the emphasis
on the trustee's obligations both to prevent
wasting of the resource and to not run it into
the ground. This shifts the focus on current
income considerably. It also justifies extremely
conservative management: there are no effective guides to social, economic or biological
conditions of the future, nor do we have anything like a clear understanding of what the
long-term consequences of intense harvesting
or alteration of forest systems might be.
Therefore, the trustee's efforts to protect and
maintain a functioning forest ecosystem system in the face of the long-term commitments
of the trust is arguably prudent. 176
A second element of the state's arguments
concerning prudence centers on economic factors. The trustee must evaluate the total portfolio of each trust and determine where and
175. See Souder, et al.. Sustainable Resources
Management and State School Lands: The Quest for Guiding
Principles. 34

NAT.

REs. 1.217. 279, passim (1994).

176. The plaintiff's argument is at best a hard one
to make: the assertion that there is 'only one way" or a

-sole solution- requires unanimity among experts from a
variety of disciplines which is not even present in the testimony of DNR witnesses. On matters biological. it Is
extremely difficult to support an assertion that the natur-

al world works in easily predicted ways and that we are
sufficiently knowledgeable to respond with equally obvious programs that will unquestionably have the desired
result. See Fairfax & Huntsinger The New Western History An

Essay From the Woods (and Rangelands). 54 ARz. 0 191
(1997); Rogers. Adaptation of Environmental Law to the
Ecologists' Discovery of Disequilibria, 69

CHI.-KENT L.

REv. 887

(1994); Fairfax, Dynamic Equilibrium and Judicial Review of
Agency Decisions. in
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when to make investments that will meet the
trustee's obligation to make money. Art Stems,
a manager in the DNR for 26 years, noted that
constraints and opportunities confronting the
trust are diverse- some are "quantifiable and
time-certain, but many of them are based on
judgments considering historical events and
possible future economic, policy, and social
scenarios,'1"? As the Loomis State Forest "con-

tains much of the least productive trust forest
land in the state in terms of timber growth
potential and return on investments." Steams
pointed out, "the Loomis Forest historically
has not been a high priority for investment of
limited trust management funds,"178 Thus,

Stearns argued, "opportunity costs must be
considered Funds invested for low return or
net-cost salvage operations in the Loomis are
funds that cannot be invested elsewhere for
perhaps greater returns Given the economic
and biologic uncertainties discussed earlier,
there is no 'right' answer for the best level of
salvage in the Loomis."1

None of this is particularly surprising.
Economic factors obviously require the trustee
to balance risk and opportunity-to exercise
prudence, The state also made other argu ments where the background principles are
easily recognized but the outcomes are more
controversial- Their discussions of the planning for the Loomis clearly evince a commitment to what might be called -political prudence." The trustee is obligated, the state
VATERSHED MNA'GE''ENT C,0:FECENZE 147 (Oct 23-25.
19961 'he biolog of forest ecosystems is not a perfect

science.- asserted declarant Steams There are potential
risks to the trusts in being more aggressive in the harvesting of timber to maximize value There are potential
risks to the trusts in being more protective of wildiife
habitat and other public resources The anticipated
Loomis Plan is intended to strike a balance of risks at this
point intime while creating and maintaining flexibility as
more reliable biological information is available in the
future Okanogan, supra note 138, Stearns Declaration at
9-10
177 Okanogan, supra note 138, Steams Declaration
at 2-3.
178 Id at 5-7
179- Okanogan supra note 138. Stearns Declaration
at 5-7. id. Declaration of Wes Culp, DNR Regional
Manager for the Northeast Region at 2-3
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claimed, to proceed in a way that will allow
them to continue to operate. The state presented three kinds of data to make this argument. First, they argued that political conditions could and, in fact did, threaten the productivity of the trust.
Since the late 1980s, forest management in the Loomis State Forest has
been intensely scrutinized. Planned
sales were protested by other state
agencies and interested parties ....
The threat of litigation was constant. In
general, operations in the forest were
grinding down and frustrating everyone
involved. This was greatly hampering
the DNR's ability to manage the forest
for the benefit of the trust with any
80°
predictability or degree of success.
Second, they argued that conservative
management, careful planning, and trust
building among interested parties, any one of
whom could toss a "monkey wrench" into the
works in the form of a protest or a lawsuit, was
in the best interests of the trust. The state
argued that the reason their interim sales program, that is, sales offered prior to the completion of the landscape plan, was successful was
due, "in no small part, to the trust levels
patiently built and nurtured over the past couple of years. I think many of our critics are
being convinced that we are doing things
methodically and professionally."' 8 ' Third, they
argued that their trust building was workingthat the Loomis sales, although challenged
and delayed by intense planning and public
involvement, was moving forward at slightly
more than the level proposed in plaintiffs'
180.

Okanogan. supra note 138, Culp Declaration at

2.
181. Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of
Charles I. Johnson, Highlands District Manager, Northeast
Region. DNR at 4.

see also Okanogan, supra note 138, State
182. See id.;
Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Request for

Mandamus at 2 ("The petitioners' motion seeks to portray
the long-term planning process in an evil light as responsible for a shutdown in the timber sales program of tim-
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The state's assertions of "political prudence" are confused by a question of whether
the state can make laws that reduce income to
the trust and, if so, is the trust boind by them,
Plaintiffs appear confused by the Skamania
decision in this regard. The "real lesson of
Skamania," timber counties assert, is that
the State as sovereign may not enact
laws that conflict with its fiduciary
duties as trustee of the timber trust
lands. To the extent of the conflict, any
such law is invalid. That includes not
only the law struck down in Skamania
but also laws governing management
of .public lands if and to the extent
those laws would cause the Trustee to
manage the timber trust lancs for any
purpose other than the sole and exclusive benefit of schools and counties, 8V
This is simply incorrect. There is absolutely no basis for quibbling: the trustee is
required to do business in compliance with
laws of general applicability as is any other
entity doing business in the state. Washington
counties have been particularly aggressive in
asserting that both federal and state laws that
restrict the profitability of the trust are inapplicable to the trust. And the, lose every
time. 184 Noel v. Cole, 185 discussed sv'pra, is particularly relevant. Plaintiffs' complaint about the
extent and duration of the state's planning for
the Loomis, and its request that the court simply impose a preferred plan on the Department, is based, as the court noted, on the
assumption that the DNR does not have to
comply with the planning and public involve-

ber from Loomis. In truth, the State's planning efforts
have permitted, rather than hindered, the State to move
towards a successful interim short-term timber sales program for the Loomis.... ").
183. Okanogan. supra note 138, Trial Brief of the
Timber Counties at 18-19.
184. See Board of Natural Resourc,2s v. Brown, 992
F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993); Case v. Bowles, 3:'7 U.S. 92 (1945);
Noel v. Cole, 655 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1982).
185. Noel v. Cole, supra note 126.
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ment requirements of
The basic rule is that thetrust must, as any
other business entity, comply with all state
laws of general applicability. Federal rules that
both discriminate against the trust and undercut the trust's ability to serve the beneficiary
are also allowed when there is an overriding
federal interest-as in the case of the timber
export ban.i8 7 State rules that specifically
direct the trust to utilize trust resources to benefit interests other than the trust are not
allowed. That was the issue in Skamania, and
the Washington Supreme Court was emphatic.18
But the DNR is making, in addition, a
slightly different point. How far can the trustee
go in complying with external requirements?
Must they merely meet the minimum standard? Can they over comply, doing more than
is required to protect watersheds, endangered
species, or cultural resources? Can they hold
off or pull sales, as Commissioner Boyle did, in
an effort to forestall criticism and more draconian regulation? At a minimum, the DNR's
actions are vulnerable to challenge if they do
not comply with their own Departmental procedures and regulations. The resource plan
adopted in 1992 said that the DNR would do
landscape plans that would comply with SEPA,
and weigh all the resources at risk, including
189
water quality and state listed species. You
would be vulnerable to challenge, Deputy
Stearns suggested, if you have not addressed
those issues because "you haven't done a landscape plan as the policy of the Board of Natural
Resources says you must do."'19
The DNR went further and argued that it
was prudent in some cases to exceed minimum
standards, even though it imposed short-term
costs on the trust. This was justified with two

arguments- protecting resources and investments, and maintaining future sources of
income.

186. "Petitioner's expert. Fred Ebel. believes that
DNR's management of the Loomis Forest since 1992 has
not been prudent in dealing with the mountain pine beetle epidemic, although he did not consider the possible
constraints of the State Environmental Protection Act in
forming this opinion.' Okanogan, supra note 138. Decision
at 7.
187. See Okanogan. supra note 138, State Respondent's Brief at 17.
188. County of Skamania, supra note 97. see alho STATE

TRUsT

SEPA.186

Riparian protection in excess of minimum standards provides additional
protection for trust resources such as
soil and capital improvements such as
culverts and roads Consistent with the
duty of a trust manager, DNR believes
it is prudent to manage state forest
lands and forest resources so future
sources of income are not foregone by
actions taken today "l
Finally, DNR asserted that it will undertake
some actions that do not produce profit for the
trust simply to maintain working relations in
the community "Strong emphasis was put on
involvement of other state agencies and interested parties in order to develop a level of trust
that would allow timber sale operations to successfully advance to more appropriate levels."9 2
One might ask, given all the flexibility that
the notion of prudence potentially introduces
into trust management, given the DNR's
emphasis on public involvement, and SEPA's
NEPA-like demands for plans, papers, and a
reviewable record, what becomes of the mandate to achieve maximum returns for the beneficiary? How, given all this prudence, does the
trust mandate finally differ from the multiple
use mandate of which the GAO complained?
The answer is simple, There is no getting
around the need for flexibility and judgment,
whether it is called discretion or prudence, in
managing complex ecosystems Multiple use
and trust land managers alike must consider
complex political and biophysical systems. It is
L.A

189

supra note 5, at 160-62

1992 P z:iPLAsupra note 135

190 Okanogan supra note 138, State Respondents
Brief in Opposition to Request tor Mandamus Writ at 7 (citing Steams Declaration at 131)
191 Okanogan, supra note 138, State Resps; Bnef in
Opposition to Request for Mandamus Writ at 28
192 Okanogan, supra note 138, Culp Declaration at 4
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important to note that only the trust land
manager is obligated to consider opportunity
costs, and that the DNR, and not the federal
government, operates in a cost-constrained
investment environment.
The major point, however, is that there
are clear benchmarks for evaluating the
trustee's prudence. The clarity of the goal
does not indemnify the trust manager from
.public debate. At bottom, expectations are
clear and all contenders understand that the
major goal is to produce returns for the beneficiaries.
2. The Arrearages Dispute: Setting and
Achieving Harvest Levels
The same issues that led to the evolution
of the DNR's planning process have been pivotal in the emergence of another difficult
issue, a hot conflict over arrearages. The term
arises from sharp reductions in the cut on
state lands that occurred during the early
1990s. Historically, Washington timber mills
have received on the average about 1.2 billion board feet (BBF) per year from the federal government and 700 MBF from the state.
With problems in federal sales resulting from
the National Forest Management Act and the
ESA court suits, federal timber sales have
practically disappeared from the market
(about one year's worth of volume over 6
years in the early 1990s). This caused the
industry to focus more on state sales (plus
the fact that stumpage prices for domestic
and export have equalized; see below). When
the state sold only 370 million board feet
(MMBF) in .1994, the timber industry was
shocked.193
The core of this dispute is to be found in
sustained yield. Sustained yield's historic origins derived from concern that forests were
being harvested faster than they were growing, which would ultimately result in a "timber famine." At its simplest, sustained yield
harvests annually an amount equal to the
stand's annual physical growth (called its
193. Telephone Interview with Jill Mackey (April
1995). Ms. Mackey's analysis is that the beneficiaries were
not aware of the downfall in sales because stumpage

"increment"). For example, if tree or stand
maturity is determined (by specific criterion
or criteria) to be eighty years, then each year
one-eightieth of the stand (forest) would be
harvested. This system is most easily envisaged 'with even-aged management regimes,
where specific areas can be harvested (i.e.,
for an 800 acre unit with a rotation age of 80
years, 10 acres could be harvested each year
under this strategy). For uneven.,aged (selective) forest management strategies, the
determination of harvest ages and amounts
is more difficult. Here, typically individual
trees (or small groups) are harvested when
they are mature (economically, physically,
grade, or some combination), but the difficulty is to maintain adequate growing stock of
young trees within the stands so that an
equal volume of trees are available in the
future.
Sustained yield systems in the United
States were first established on federal forest
lands. The emphasis was two-fold: protecting
the biological and physical integrity (by not
harvesting at too rapid a rate) and providing
flows of resources with the idea to stabilize
traditionally "boom and bust," "cut and run"
industries and their associated communities.
Economists have never liked the concept of
even harvest levels, and have roundly criticized the Forest Service for its policies.
Economists want the market to signal the
demand for timber supplies. If timber sales
are made on an even basis, then the seller is
restricted from placing stumpage on the market when prices are high, and conversely continues to sell stumpage when prices are low.
While "sustained yield units" had been
established previously for portions of the
state forest lands, in the process of establishing the DNR, the policy became official. In
1971, the legislature adopted the sustained
yield approach and defined it as "management of the forest to provide harvesting on a
continuing basis without major prolonged
curtailment or cessation of harvest.' 94
prices had doubled.
194. WASH. REV.

CODE § 79.68.030,
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DNR practices in reaching sustainable
harvest levels and annual cuts have shifted
during the past twenty-five years. Sustainable
harvest is described in the FLMP as a "compromise between an economic schedule and
a biological schedule." 195 The policy was
restated in the 1992 plan: "the [Diepartment
will manage state forest lands to produce a
sustainable, even-flow harvest of timber, subject to economic, environmental and regula96
tory constraints."'
The overall planning period for sustainable harvests is 200 years, broken down into
targets for each decade. Ten-year harvest levels prior to 1970 were referred to as the
"allowable cut." This term was replaced with
"sustainable harvest" to more accurately portray the way in which timber is sold. Although
not required by the statute, the DNR has for
several years followed a policy of approximate even flow timber sales from year to year.
Prior to 1983, Board policy was to allow fluctuations of up to 50 percent from year to year.
Now there is a 25 percent ceiling on annual
harvest level fluctuations. Purchasers of the
timber sales in general cut the timber in
197
years subsequent to the actual sale.
The DNR calculates the amount of harvestable timber for three principal time periods. Sustainable yield calculations cover a
planning period of twenty decades, with the
decade as the basic planning period. This is a
longer term assessment of the "carrying
capacity" based upon the level the lands can
biologically sustain. Within this overall
assessment, fluctuations in timber sales from
195.

FLMP. supra note 141. at 42.

196.

1992 Poucy PLAN. supranote 135, at Policy No 4,

197. See FLMP, supra note 141. at 42; DNR Study
Group. A Report on Management of Forest Trust Lands in the State

of Washington, Part A: General Report Section 1(Dec. 1977)
The DNR's policy on sustained yield control groups has
also shifted over the years. In 1967. sustainable harvest cal-

culations were based on one group, or all state lands combined. Taking all state forest lands as a whole, the oldest
timber was cut first. This practice was questioned when, in
1967, sales were concentrated on grant lands where the
oldest stands existed. On other trust lands, particularly in
the western part of the state, sales were significantly lower,
This caused a dramatic shift in revenues to the various trust
accounts associated with western Washington state trust
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decade to decade are acceptable absent a
prolonged cessation or curtailment. 9 8
Calculations of sustainable yields factor in
the necessary resource management activities to support the harvest level, including
planting, pre-commercial thinning, and fertilization.19
The long-term sustained yield affects the
decadal levels and the annual sales, Harvest
levels are established for each planning
decade. These are defined as the volume of
timber scheduled for sale from state-owned
lands as calculated by the DNR and approved
by the Board 200 Within these decadal plans,
annual timber sale levels are determined,
considering market changes. As discussed
above, changes in annual sales levels are now
limited to 25 percent of the average annual
sale. 20' The annual timber sale level is set
about a year in advance. The Board reviews
the DNR's calculations and approves the
annual sale level
Other factors may affect the average
annual sales level For example, the average
annual sales level for the period 1991-2001
202
was estimated by the DNR to be 840 MMBF
This figure was subsequently adjusted downward to reflect northern spotted owl and
other harvest restrictions An annual sales
level for this decade was never formally calculated by DNR nor adopted by the Board
due to an uncertain and unstable regulatory
environment, including the listing of the
spotted owl. the Olympic Experimental
Forest harvest calculations, and anticipated
203
changes to the Forest Practices Act.

lands, and prompted a change in the DNR's practice
198 SeeWA Re' Co:E § 79 68 030
199

See FLMP, supra note 141, at 42

200 SeeWAs' Rv. C:E § 79 68 035
201. The annual fluctuations were changed from -up
to 50 percent' to "up to 25 percent" See FLMP supra note
141
202 See 1992 Pcu v P~s, supra note 135, at 18. See
allo WAsH R. Cj:E § 43 30 390 tif decisions by entities
other than the DNR cause a decrease in the sustainable
harvest identified in the 1983 FLMP the DNR should offer
additional timber sales from other state-managed landsj.
203 Telephone Interview with Art Steams tMay 22,
1995)
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With that brief discussion of sustained
yield calculations behind us, it is possible to
understand the core of the timber industry's
"shock" and the arrearages dispute. The pattern in DNR sales since 1980 is shown in
Figure 1. Sales levels dropped below sustained yield in the early 1980s as a result of
economic factors, and in the early 1990s as a
result of environmental factors. The amount
of variation in both cases since 1992 exceeds
the policy limits established in 1983 of plus
or minus 25 percent discussed previously.
And while the DNR has offered timber for sale
above sustained yield levels (1986 to 1990)
in an effort to make up past deficits the

percentage sold above sustained yield levels
has never matched the percentage deficits
caused 204
by either economic or environmental.
factors.
Based on the 1992 Forest Resource
Policy Plan, the DNR projected sales of 550
MMBF in 1992. 650 MMBF in 1993, and 675
MMBF annually during the period 1994 to
1996. Had the 1992 plan been followed, the
DNR's sales level would have ranged from 30
percent below ('92) to 14 percent below ('94'96) their previously determined sustained
yield level. 20 ' Because of uncertainties in
potential harvest

Figure 1
Effective annual sales in relationship to designated sustained yield level
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activities and ongoing inventories, however,
the 1992 Plan specifically stated that the DNR
could not determine sustainable harvest levels at that time, but expected that they would
be calculated in early 1993.
What happens when the annual cuts do
not, at the end of a planning decade, meet
the ten-year model? A 1987 statute requires
the DNR to develop a plan to deal with existing and projected future arrearages. 206 The
DNR has not developed a plan since this law
was adopted, although it did prepare a 1986
report on how to deal with arrearages.
To understand the stumpage sales and
arrearage issue requires recognizing that purchasers are essentially speculating in the
timber product futures market. While the
state calculates its sales at a sustained yield
level of 777 MMBF, 207 purchasers are buying
stumpage based on expectations of future
demand, alternative supply sources, and timber product prices.
What is the DNR's practice for a typical
timber sale? Initially, the DNR, very much like
the Forest Service. will conduct a general
examination of the potential for a sale in an
area and examine access, environmental and
other conditions associated with the particular area. A decision is made on whether to
proceed in light of these conditions. This is
the preliminary risk assessment. The area is
then cruised, and run through the requirements of the Forest Practices Act and SEPA.
SEPA serves as a vehicle for public review and
input. The DNR then, with assistance from
the attorney general's office, develops a proposed contract. An internal policy check is
conducted by DNR staff and taken to the
Commissioner. If it passes the internal check.
the proposed sale and appraisal, and possibly additional documentation, it is taken to
the Board for approval. State agencies such
206.

See WAsH. REv. CODE § 79.68.045.

207.

See FLMP, supra note 141, at 44,

208.

Leonard Guss Associates. Selling Timber or

Conveying Cutting Rights from State Trust Lands: Examining
Alternative Means (1989) [hereinafter Guss Reportl.
209.

Board of Natural Resources, Minutes at 26

(August 4. 1981). The expectation of increasing prices for

as Fish and Wildlife may also get involved in
making presentations to the Board if other
resource issues are raised by the proposed
sale. Once the Board approves the timber
sale it is taken to public auction.
How are timber prices established for
each sale? Appraisals are conducted by the
DNR for each sale, Prior to 1990, the residual
appraisal value (value at mill less costs) was
followed, a method roughly equivalent to
that used by the Forest Service. After evaluation by the DNR in 1990, transaction evidence
became the principal appraisal method, The
DNR now looks at full market value which
includes transaction evidence, prior sales,
grade, volume, and other factors, and uses a
sealed bid auction process A 1989 study by
Guss & Associates recommended a lumpsum sales approach (in contrast to a -scale"
sales approach) to achieve closer to market
value 208 This approach was implemented by
the DNR following Board approval
The way sales contracts are written, a purchaser generally has three years before being
required to harvest a particular sale As a
result, purchasers, especially in today's supply-constricted market, will attempt to buy
contracts and maintain a backlog of purchased sales so that they will be guaranteed
the availability of stumpage to meet market
demands 209 Figure 2.infra shows the relationships for the past 35 years
When the timber product market price
goes below the price paid for a specific sale,
the purchaser will delay harvesting that particular sale until either market conditions
improve or the contract expires and harvest is
required That does not mean, however, that
the company is no longer actively seeking
stumpage to buy. The company is still seeking contracts, but searches for stumpage that
can be purchased, and economically harvestlumber in the late 1970s and early 1980s led one representative of a timber association to state, that it is 'significant to keep in mind that the purchaser of the timber
sales currently bids higher than he can actually afford to
pay for the timber expecting a higher return when the
timber is actually cut and sold- Statement of Carl
Newport, Mason, Bruce & Girard, Inc, representing the
Western Forest Industries Association to the Board of
Natural Resources at their August, 1981 meeting
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ed and processed, at prevailing market rates
(or if it has its own lands it may harvest them).
At any given time, a purchaser will have a portfolio of sales with each sale having a different
stumpage price, different logging costs, and a
different species and grade mix. Presumably,
the company makes harvest decisions optimal-

ly accounting for these considerations,
Because the stumpage market works this
way, purchasers would like the DNR to annually supply stumpage on a relatively consistent
basis (called even-flow in the Federal context).
This provides the timber company with a mix of
higher- and lower-priced stumpage for their

Figure 2

Timber sold, harvested, and volume remaining under contract, 1960-1996.
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Current Washington law 210 requires the Board

establish a sustained yield level (by policy
calculated on a decadal basis from the "on
base" suitable timberlands); and, if within any
given decade this amount of timber is not
sold,2 1' then the DNR is required to conduct
an analysis to determine how to sell this timber in a way that "provides the greatest return
to the trusts based upon economic conditions then existing and forecast, as well as
impacts on the environment of harvesting the
212
additional timber."
For the reasons given above, however,
just because the DNR sells a relatively constant amount of timber annually does not
mean that purchasers harvest the same
amount each year (see Figure 2). So two factors are present: first, the "arrearage" in
stumpage offered for sale by the DNR. and
second, the "arrearage" in harvesting by purchasers with existing contracts that have not
yet been cut. One way to look at this relationship is to analyze past DNR sales and harvesting, starting with the run-up in stumpage
prices in the late 1970s through 1983. Events
during this period resulted in "arrearage"
problems that culminated in the 1987 legislation requiring reconciliation of sustained
213
yield calculations and stumpage sales.
The arrearages controversy arises from
the fact that two interpretations of the timber
sale arrearage issue are possible: industry's
and statutory construction. Industry contends
that the DNR has roughly a 2 billion board
foot arrearage. However, based on the state
statute, a different interpretation can be
offered.2 14 The statue defines the relevant
terms as:

"Default" means the volume of timber
remaining when a contractor fails to
meet the terms of the sales contract
on the completion date of the contract or any extension thereof and
timber returned to the state under
WASH REV CODE 79 01 1335
"Arrearage" means the summation of
the annual sustainable harvest timber
volume since luly 1, 1979, less the
sum of state timber sales contract
default volume and the state timber
sales volume deficit since July 1, 1979
(emphasis addedj215

The difference in interpretation depends
upon whether the default sales volume is
added to the deficit. Thus, depending upon
one's interpretation, the calculation of arrearage becomes either
A Arrearage = 7- (Sustained Yield -

Annual Sales + Default) for all years
since FY '80
B Arrearage = X, (Sustained Yield Annual Sales - Default) for all years

since FY '80
Figure 3 (A and B) shows the results of
these two differences, with the industry perspective (A) in the top portion of the figure
and an interpretation of the statutory construction (B) in the bottom portion.

"Deficit" means the summation of the
difference between the department's
annual planned sales program vol210.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 79.68040,

211. This is the "arrearage defined In NVASH. RE%,
CODE § 79.68.035(1).
212. WASH. REV.. CODE § 79.68.045. See alo WASH
DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES. REPORT TO LEGISLATURE: Ti.EER

SALE AtrE,%E (1986j

as an example of an equivalent

analysis
213 See WAsH RE
Laws 1987, ch 159. § 4
214

Id

Con

§ 7968045, enacted in
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Figure 3

Timber industry and statute perspectives on DNR sale arrearages
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The legislature dealt with the arrearage
issues subsequent to Skamania when it passed
Chapter 159 Section 2. Laws 1987. This statute
defines the terms above and, if an arrearage
exists at the end of a planned decade, requires
the DNR to conduct an analysis of alternatives
to provide the greatest return to the trusts
while minimizing the impact on the environ216
ment.
While language in the legislative findings
appears to allow the DNR to sell the 1.1 billion
board feet of timber defaulted above the sustained yield level between 1984 and 1993, and
the DNR prepared a report on how they
planned to do so, the DNR is not expressly
required to sell this timber, especially if environmental impacts cannot be mitigated. 217 The
DNR, however, is required to prepare an analysis if arrearage exists in any given planning
decade. Without the default sales volume, and
without a sustained yield harvest level set for
1993 and subsequent y~ars, the aggregate
decadal deficit (1984-1992) is calculated to be
ofily I MMBF. Adding the deficit for 1993.
assuming a 785 MMBF sustained yield level
(which is not assumed by the 1992 Forest
Plan), gives a decadal arrearage of 251 MMBF
roughly one-tenth of what the timber industry
contends exists.
Two different reasons caused arrearage:
first, timber purchasers defaulted on their contracts over the period from 1981 to 1986 in the
aggregate amount of 1.235 billion board feet,
These defaults occurred at the same time that
DNR sales levels dropped 670 million board
feet ('81-'85) due to lack of purchasers. which
combined resulted in a cumulative sales deficit
of 1.938 billion board feet under sustained
yield levels. Even while defaulting on existing
high-price contracts, however, purchasers (in
aggregate) were buying replacement stumpage. This can be seen by the pattern of defaults
215.

Id.

216.

See WASH. RE,. CODE § 79,68045

217.

See id.

218. This analysis will use the Waggener dissertation. supra note 59. and WALTER MEAD, COMPETMON AND
OuGOPSONY IN THE DOUGLAS FIR TvIBER PRODUCt INDUSTRY

(1966) as a starting points. Sale levels, particularly deficits
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in relation to DNR sales arrearage, The DNR's
sale arrearage existed basically for only three
years, from 1981 to 1983, In 1984. in fact, the
DNR sold slightly above the sustained yield
level, dipping slightly below the next year. In
contrast, defaults on existing sold stumpage
began slowly in 1981 and 1982, reached their
peak in 1983 1583 MMBF), remained high for
1984, and did not disappear until 1987, two
years after the Skamania suit put an end to contract buyouts
Until 1990. the DNR attempted to reconcile
the previous arrearage by selling above the
sustained yield level, From 1985 to 1990 the
DNR sold at or above the sustained yield level.
a cumulative makeup of 428 MMBF This met
about half of the stumpage previously unsold
due to lack of sales in 1981 to 1983. but did
nothing to settle the defaulted sales' deficit. In
contrast, the sale arrearage situation in the
1990s resulted primarily from deferring
stumpage sales to reconcile environmental
protection. In the early period, 1991 to 1993.
the level of sale was approximately 500 to 600
MMBF instead of 770 MMBF This temporarily
changed in 1994 when only about 350 MMBF
was sold
3 Timber Supply from State Trust Lands
The supply of timber from state trust lands
will be considered in light of the following topics: long term sustained yield ILTSY), desires of
purchasers for an even flow of logs from trust
lands, and past recommendations to the DNR
and Board regarding timber sale levels These
topics will be considered in the general context
18
of when. and how, to sell stumpage, 2
A useful starting point in analyzing these
issues is to distinguish between la) the concept of sustained yield in the long-term, and
(b) the even flow of timber sales lor harvests)
volume on an annual basis As Figure I and the
from long-term sustained yield, were covered in the DNR's
AE Supra
REPORT TO ThE LEz SLATURE TwBER SALE AFARA

note 201, as required by H C R 29 From a portfolio management perspective, the Guss Report to the DNR provides
recommendations respecting the efficacy of sustained
yield strategies in light of trust responsibilities Supra
note 208 Similarly, ZINHq'i, ET AL, TivB3RL.,.D
INvEST,%'ETS A P ,TUU:ui PERSPEcrr.E 119921 provides sup-
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if and as over-mature timber that
would otherwise be cut is set aside to
221
wait its turn.
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accompanying discussion demonstrated, economic and environmental constraints commonly lead to considerable variation from the
DNR's calculated sustained yield sales level.
The question of whether an even flow timber
sales strategy is the best policy for the beneficiaries was discussed in the 1992 Forest
Resources Plan, and its ramifications were
looked at in greater detail in the 1989 "Guss
Report."2 19 The Forest Resources Plan explicitly
states that the DNR has adopted an even flow
policy.220 The Guss Report set out an alternative strategy that identified procedures that
would allow the DNR to utilize market signals
to determine when to sell stumpage:

Figure 4 shows, in simple terrs, the relationship between the average price received for
DNR stumpage (the dark black line), and the
amount of stumpage sold (not including contract defaults). The market for DNR stumpage
in the early 1980s demonstrates the relationship between demand and price,. As prices
dropped, DNR stumpage demand dropped.
However the situation in the mid-1980s shows
that the DNR placed large volumes of
stumpage on the market prior to price recovery
beginning in 1988. Then once prices continued
to increase, the DNR's sales levels initially stabilized, then precipitously dropped beginning
in 1991 as prices remained firm and then
increased. It goes without saying that outside
concerns, specifically the northern spotted owl
listing, resulted in much of the early 1990s
drop in sale volumes during a strong market;
the change in owl survey protocols caused the
precipitous drop in 1994.

Price-responsive harvesting, compared
to rigid sustained yield harvesting, produced considerably higher income, not
only from stumpage sales, but from
interest compounded on the higher
income. Net present worth is thus
greatly increased .... ITlimber volume
cut under sustained yield for old
growth forests could be less than
under flexible price responsive forestry,

gure 4
Relationship between average price received by DNR and smpage sales
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Recall again that stumpage purchasers
are essentially working in the futures market.
Given that, they require a portfolio of potential harvest areas under contract, which at
times has been as substantial as three- to
four-times the annual sales as shown in
Figure 4 supra. The strategy purchasers use is
based on the expectation that prices (nominal and real) for both stumpage and timber
product will rise in the future. Within any one
contract is a time constraint, and possibly
environmental and physical access constraints as well. Purchasers take these factors into account when making harvest decisions; but the primary consideration is to
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cover costs (iLe., the price paid for the
stumpage plus harvest, transport and milling
expenses) and make a profit. Necessarily,
companies will first harvest stumpage giving
the highest spread between the price paid at
auction and the current market price for
stumpage. This strategy works well when
prices are generally increasing, whether real
pricqs or nominal prices. This is because the
contracts bought today will be worth more in
the future (albeit a premium may be paid
due to this expectation), and the contracts
bought two years previously are now worth
quite a bit more. This situation is illustrated
graphically in Figure 5.

Figure 5

Inflation-free effects ofspcuatiw timber purchase, harvests, and remaining contracts
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The distance between the zero line and the
top of the dark-shaded column in Figure 5 represents the average real price difference
between timber harvested for a specific year
and the average real price for stumpage sold
that year. Similarly, the distance between the
light-shaded column and the zero line represents the difference between the average real
value of stumpage under contract compared to
the average real price of stumpage sold that
year. When the lines are above zero, contracts
either harvested or remaining in purchasers'
portfolios obtain a speculative profit (realized
or potential) due to the futures nature of
stumpage sales. And the fact that purchasers
typically harvest their least expensive contracts
within their aggregate portfolio is seen by the
fact that the "Contract Premium" line is almost
always below the "Harvest Premium." This
means that there are greater profits realized
from the units harvested than from the ones
remaining (which include a mixture of older
and newer contracts).
This strategic phenomena has, in fact,
been the pattern for most recent periods in
DNR sales, as can be seen in Figure 5.
Specifically, it is the reason that purchasers
prefer to maintain large volumes under contract (as well as having certainty of supply) that
leads to the situation shown in Figure 2 where
these volumes are large relative to annual
stumpage sales. Alternative strategies, however, are called for when prices are expected to
decline in the future. In this case, the company
would harvest its most expensive (assuming
costs could be covered) contracts first, essentially to limit exposure to future price decreases, then subsequently harvest the less expensive contracts.
There would seem to be no question that
the DNR, and the trust beneficiaries, would be
better off if the speculative nature of the timber
222. Id.at 70.
223. See 1992 POLICY PLAN, supra note 135, at Part A:

General Report.
224. Id.at 10. Note, however, in this context evenflow limited near term harvests, rather than pressured to
maintain harvests at higher levels as in the present context.
Nevertheless, on purely economic grounds even flow has
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sale process could be reduced. It must be realized, however, that the DNR's even flow policy
makes a major contribution to encouraging
such behavior on the part of purchasers. The
"Guss Report" identifies significant gains from
pursuing a price-responsive stumpage marketing strategy as opposed to an even flow policy,
There seems to be considerable revenue potential if the Department can
reduce below mean sales, selling more
timber at times when higher p-ices can
be commanded ....
Timber sales need
not be withheld for long periods.
Studies suggest that as little as a two
year range over what was plan ied on a
sustained yield basis would gain much
of the available incremental revenue,
while plus or minus five years would
222
gain substantially all.
Clearly, the decision was made subsequent
to the Guss Report explicitly not to use a priceresponsive marketing strategy. ThE' 1992 Forest
Resources Plan makes it plain that the DNR is

committed to a largely even flow regime, both
from the Federal grant lands as well as from
the Forest Board lands.
The decision to use an even flow policy for
the trust lands was subject to considerable
debate before, and after, the practice was
adopted. The Economics Panel in the 1977
review of DNR and Board policy, 223 noted "concern about adoption of the 'even-flow' inter-

pretation of sustained yield management by
the Department, principally because the
Department sustainable harvest model does
not adequately incorporate economic factors."224 The Economics Panel went on to say

"that it has seen no evidence that sustained
yield/even flow leads to acceptable manage-

ment of a forest as a capital asset,"225 There
little to recommend it.Also, in the 1977 report, the Timber
Panel recommend continuance of DNR's sustained
yield/even flow policy even while the Economics Panel was
recommending against it. Id.at 10, 14-15.
225. Id. at I1."Even within the ',;ustained-yleld'

requirement, the panel views the DNR 'even flow' as unnecessarily restrictive to effective management ....
"Id,
at 14.
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were two points to this argument: first, even
flow reduces near term harvests during conversion of old growth to second growth; and secondly, even flow constrains response to market
demands (both higher and lower) for
stumpage. Regarding the second point, the
1977 Department Study Group's Timber
Harvest Panel suggested that "DNR have 200300 million board feet of timber prepared for
sale in order to be able to respond quickly to
high market demand and accompanying higher
prices; this implies that the limits of annual
fluctuation of harvest within a decade be
226
widened"
Given the volatile timber market in the
mid- to late-1970s (see Figure), the Board (with
Bert Cole as Commissioner and Chair) was
requested at its November 7, 1978 meeting to
expand the limits of annual sale fluctuations to
plus or minus 50 percent, and for decadal sales
to plus or minus 10 percent of the decade's
sustained yield harvest. 227 The Board generally
agreed to allow this.228 DNR policies to reduce

timber placed on the market during 1981
engendered a response from representatives of
the Western Forest Industries Association
(WFIA) at the August, 1981 Board meeting,22
The DNR proposed reducing sales by 50 percent in the first half of the decade, then
increasing them 50 percent during the second
half (this was called Strategy #1 in the
Department Staff Report to the Board). 230 The
226. Id.at 19.
227.

See Board of Natural Resources. Minutes 48

(Nov. 7, 1978).

228. We were unable to confirm the final approval
date of this action, although the change was virtually
assured at the above-mentioned Nov. 1978 Board meeting.
229. See Board of Natural Resources. Minutes 26
(Aug. 7, 1981).
230.

See id.

231.

See id. Note that this was the identical ratio-

nale for the contract buyouts litigated in Skamania. supra
note 97.
232. See Board of Natural Resources. Minutes 10
(Jan. 5. 1988).
Responding to Vandenberg's comment. Boyle
said there was a conscious decision made by
this Board in the low period of the economy that
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representative for the WFIA raised concerns
not only about the availability of funding for
trust beneficiaries, but also about effects on
small, dependent firms and the number of
future bidders for DNR sales. 231 The 1983 FLMP
established the present sustained-yield even
flow timber sale constraints, 232 These constraints are that annual sales be within plus or
minus 25 percent of the long term sustained
yield, and that the decadal sustained yield
amounts be harvested, or that according to
statute, the DNR must devise a plan to do
SO.233

Ultimately. the question regarding the
DNR's sustained yield even flow policy comes
down to factors outside economic considerations. Clearly, from a strictly financial standpoint, even flow has a difficult challenge to
overcome. Past discussion in the Board, particularly during Brian Boyle's tenure as
Commissioner and Chair, tended to offset the
financial losses from even flow by justifying it
during poor market conditions to protect both
the DNR's and the timber industry's ability to
effectively (and competitivelyj sell and purchase timber during the good periods. Also
related, but not easily determinable from the
data. is whether the DNR was in fact constrained by even flow policies from offering
higher levels of sales during good market periods.
There is perhaps justification based on
they were going to keep a sales program going
In the FLMP they decided that they were going
to change the policy of varying the sales level by
50 percent-plus or minus and changed it to 25
percent, plus or minus They realized and dis-

cussed with the Board that there needed to be a
certain level of sales policy in order to keep
employment levels going He was not talking
about employing people as a trust responsibility, but that they needed to keep a bid pool going
because the market would eventually turn
around and that our people needed to be
equipped to sell timber and there needed to be
a market for the timber at the time that the market turned around It didn't make sense from a
trust standpoint to stop the sales program
Id
233 See W sH REv CODE § 79 68 045 Enacted by
Laws 1987, ch 159. § 4, supra note 213

Jon Ak
Soudler, et ol.

iou A.Soudw~ et al.
trust land origins for at least some even flow of
timber during poor market conditions. If the
purpose of the Forest Board lands is to reforest
land and provide a stable supply of timber to
the locality, then, at least for the Forest Board
lands, an even flow, rather than a revenue-maximizing or price-responsive, timber sale policy
could be justified. 234 The Board, in fact, spent a
lot of time during the 1980s considering the
effects of its sales levels on local communities
and dependent industries, as well as on beneficiary requirements. There was little concurrence among Board members on how to proceed. Some members, principally the Dean of
the College of Forest Resources, wanted to
continue to offer timber for sale even when it
appeared very likely that the bottom had fallen
out of the market and many previous sales
would be defaulted. 235 Others, including representatives of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, wanted to scale back sales in order
to preserve the trusts, in this case the Common
Schools capital in the form of old growth. 236
V. Conclusion
The GAO Report missed or muddied
important similarities, such as the even flow
sustained yield constraint and the timber sales
contracts, between state and federal management and also inadequately explored major
differences between the two systems. It is not
adequate to say that because the goals are
simpler, state planning is less controversial, or
because the state relies on receipts for fund234.

See generally WASH.

REV. CODE § 76.12.020

235. See Board of Natural Resources, Minutes 26
(Aug. 4. 1981), supra note 209.
236. See id. at 24. See also Board of Natural
Resources, Minutes 14 (Jan. 5. 1988).

[Bill Daley, Administrative Assistant to
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Frank
Brouilletl said ICommissionerl Boyle knew very
well that the major holdings of the school trust
were part of that last decade [of salesl in a
depressed market and much of it was old
growth. We were dealing here with the remnants
of that. The original environmental plan was
developed by Boyle's predecessor and had been
thoroughly consistently implemented over the
last few years. it had been a plan that cut all of
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ing, their management is going to be more efficient. We have seen in the arrearage dispute
that in the fundamental intellectual structure
of the timber program, the state's commitment
to sustained yield/even flow is every bit as inefficient as the federal program. And we have
observed that the state's timber sale contracts
allow the purchaser all the speculative advantages of the market, with very clear disadvantages to the trust.
But we have also seen that the states are
able to sell more timber more efficiently than
the federal government. We attribute this not
to an absence of controversy but to mechanisms for containing it. By far the most important is the constitutional status of the mandate-as long as there is a beneficiary or other
public spirited citizen to sue to enforce the
trust, the legislature is limited in :he extent to
which it can divert trust resources to subsidize
other public purposes. We have seen, however,
that when there is no litigant to challenge such
patent nonsense as the state's timber sale and
even flow policies, the trust is not vindicated.
We have also observed the impoltance of the
notion of prudence in evaluating the trustee's
decisions.
Although prudence appears, in many
respects, to resemble the chaos of discretion,
inherent in the multiple use slandard, the
resemblance does not recreate on state lands
the problems the GAO observed with federal
management. Although it is utter nonsense to
assert that the trust lands are uncontroversial,
the Loomis and arrearage disputes demonthat old growth at a time when we faced a baby
boom in the 1980s and1990s. It also cut everything in a depressed market We urifed at that

time that not be done. We sought legislation to
prevent it from being done, but it was done any....
As a matter of fact there was corre-

way

spondence consistently to that effect In this

past year urging that in the adoption of the policies related to old growth held in the common
school trust, we would approach the legislature
for a different long-term solution to the way to
build schools In the short term and ;ave those
resources for when we would need them and
when they were likely to be more valuable to us,
Id.at 14.
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strate the contrary quite emphatically, the
expectations surrounding the lands are much
clearer. In the Loomis case. we see disagreement as to what the goal means, but we do not
see disagreement about the goal. And in the
arrearages case, we find that all the arguments
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are made in the context of shared assumptions
about the priorities. This culture of acceptance
of the mandate, and its underlying notion of
prudence, seems to us to be the place to start
when trying to explain the differences in the
outcomes between the two ownerships.

